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ABSTRACT
Cyberattacks loom over the technological landscape as a dire 
threat to Internet commerce, information security, and even national 
security. Meaningfully improving cybersecurity and ensuring the 
resilience of systems will require cooperation between members of 
the private sector and the government. To this end, we propose a 
framework that creates a circle of trust for the sharing of 
information about threats and solutions. To emphasize the 
importance of cooperation to enhance cyber defense, this Article 
presents a case study of two items: the proposed legislative regime of 
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, and President 
Obama’s Executive Order 13,636 with its emphasis on a 
Cybersecurity Framework that would establish voluntary 
cybersecurity standards. Through application of our circle of trust 
framework, we hope to provide a solution that balances the 
sometimes competing concerns of privacy and cybersecurity.
Our secondary focus is whether such a program should 
emphasize voluntary or mandatory compliance. A proper balance 
between the two approaches could improve the dynamics between 
the public and private sectors in a way that increases respective 
levels of trust. The Executive Order and CISPA both use a voluntary 
approach. Under each system as currently proposed, firms could 
choose to follow the program, but compliance is not mandatory, and 
there is no penalty for noncompliance. However, mandatory 
programs with effective enforcement mechanisms are likely to result 
in higher levels of compliance than purely voluntary programs in 
many situations. We urge that government intervention in the free 
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market should be kept at a low level, but because cybersecurity 
issues can have implications for national security, some degree of 
mandatory regulation would be beneficial.
We believe that cybersecurity can be enhanced without 
creating a Big Brother world and encourage the development of a 
circle of trust that brings the public and private sectors together to 
resolve cybersecurity threats more effectively. It is vital that these 
issues be addressed soon while there is still a chance to prevent a 
catastrophic cyber event. It would be ill-advised to rely solely on 
executive power or on legislation that is quickly drafted and enacted 
after an emergency. A careful, deliberative process aimed at 
protecting cybersecurity and civil liberties would ultimately be the 
most beneficial approach, and these steps must be taken now, before 
the emergence of a cybersecurity crisis that causes us to suspend 
reason.
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INTRODUCTION
“We shall meet in the place where there is no darkness.” George 
Orwell, 19841
When cybersecurity efforts fail, the consequences can be 
expensive and dangerous. The Center for Strategic and International 
Studies estimates that every year, cybercrime and economic 
espionage cost the world economy anywhere from $375 billion to 
$575 billion, with the loss to the United States alone accounting for 
about $100 billion of that total.2 A single breach of Target’s systems, 
where hackers stole payment data for millions of the retail giant’s 
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 25 (Signet Classic prtg. 1950) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).
2. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE 
GLOBAL COST OF CYBERCRIME: ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CYBERCRIME II, at 6, 8 (2014), 
available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economic-impact-
cybercrime2.pdf. The $100 billion total for the United States is based on data 
examining cybercrime as a percent of gross domestic product. For the United States, 
that percentage is 0.64%. See Tal Kopan, Cybercrime Costs $575 Billion a Year, 
$100 Billion to US, POLITICOPRO (June 10, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/cybercrime-yearly-costs-107601.html.
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customers, resulted in financial losses exceeding $300 million.3 In 
August 2014, a security firm discovered that a Russian crime ring 
stole 1.2 billion user name and password combinations from 420,000 
websites in the largest known theft of Internet credentials to date.4
The theft of this sort of information on a massive scale poses 
substantial financial danger to consumers who could become victims 
of identity theft.
Cybersecurity failures can cause much more than financial 
harm. The safety of individuals can also be threatened. Research has 
shown that it is possible to hack pacemakers and insulin pumps and 
cause them to malfunction, though thankfully there have not been 
any known attacks relating to this danger.5 Cyber hostilities are also 
gaining a larger role in international conflicts in a way that can harm 
civilians. A cyberattack on government communication systems can 
make it difficult to inform civilians about threats to ensure that they 
can evacuate to safety when necessary.6 Because civilian and 
government Internet infrastructure are so intermixed, cyberattacks 
aimed at a government are likely to also affect civilians.7 For 
example, the primary target of the sophisticated and vicious Stuxnet 
3. See Elizabeth A. Harris & Nicole Perlroth, For Target, the Breach 
Numbers Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2014, at B1; Rachel Abrams, Target Puts Data 
Breach Costs at $148 Million, and Forecasts Profit Drop, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 
2014, at B3; Banks Spent $172M on Reissuing Credit Cards Affected by Target 
Breach, BANKING BUS. REV. (Feb. 10, 2014), http://cards.banking-business-
review.com/news/us-banks-spend-172m-on-reissuing-credit-cards-affected-by-
target-breach-100214-4174469. Target’s Chief Financial Officer, John Mulligan, 
testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 4, 2014, concerning the 
theft. Target Executive Apologizes at U.S. Senate Hearing for Data Breach,
REUTERS (Feb. 4, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/04/usa-
hacking-congress-idUSL2N0L903Y20140204.
4. Nicole Perlroth & David Gelles, Russian Hackers Steal Passwords of 
Billion Users, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2014, at A1. 
5. Katherine Booth Wellington, Cyberattacks on Medical Devices and 
Hospital Networks: Legal Gaps and Regulatory Solutions, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 139, 142 (2014).
6. This is similar to what happened during the conflict between Georgia 
and Russia in 2008. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., TECHNOLOGY,
POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK 
CAPABILITIES 174 (William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 
2009).
7. Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects 
of Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1535 (2010). Admiral Michael McConnell, the 
former Director of National Intelligence, estimated that networks and systems 
owned by civilians currently transport 98% of government communications. Id. at 
1534.
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worm was the systems of nuclear enrichment facilities in Iran, but a 
flaw in the code allowed the worm to infect thousands of other 
systems around the world.8
The cyber realm is a new battlefield, and vulnerabilities can 
create a tangible threat to national security. As tensions between 
Georgia and Russia erupted into violence in 2008, cyberattacks 
against Georgian government websites made it difficult for the 
government to communicate with its citizens about the conflict.9
Malware and cyberattacks have also been used in the Syrian civil 
war, where the Syrian government uses malware to track rebel 
activity, and rebels and supporters also hack government systems.10
Stuxnet, a fearsome cyber weapon that destroyed several nuclear 
centrifuges in Iran, was allegedly created by Israeli and American 
experts.11 There is also evidence that the new Ukrainian government 
has been the target of cyberattacks, which may be related to the 
current tensions between Ukraine and Russia.12
Some economic studies of cybersecurity have found that there 
is underinvestment in security in part because many firms view 
cybersecurity as an externality.13 With the Target data breach and the 
massive data theft by a Russian crime ring happening within nine 
months of each other, stronger protections are clearly necessary, and 
policy makers should intervene to address this serious failure of the 
private market. As cyber warfare becomes a more volatile threat to 
national security, policy makers should also consider how to promote 
the best cybersecurity research at the government level. Fostering 
cooperation between the private sector and the government could 
lead to improvements in cybersecurity for both sectors as they 
8. Scott Neuman, As the Worm Turns: Cybersecurity Expert Tracks 
Blowback from Stuxnet, NPR (June 1, 2012, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/06/01/154162121/as-the-worm-turns-
cybersecurity-expert-tracks-blowback-from-stuxnet.
9. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 6, at 174.
10. In Syria, Conflict in Cyberspace Complements Ground War, NPR (Dec. 
31, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/12/31/258699442/in-syria-conflict-in-
cyberspace-complements-ground-war; see also Margaret Coker & Jennifer 
Valentino-Devries, U.S. Firm’s Gear Seen Aiding Syria, WALL ST. J., May 25-26, 
2013, at A8 (discussing information discovered by hacker group Telecomix, which 
said in 2013 that it periodically probes Syrian telecommunications systems). 
11. Ellen Nakashima & Joby Warrick, Stuxnet Was Work of U.S. and Israeli 
Experts, Officials Say, WASH. POST, June 3, 2012, at A1.
12. David E. Sanger, N.S.A. Nominee Promotes Cyberwar Units, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2014, at A18.
13. Aaron J. Burstein, Amending the ECPA to Enable a Culture of 
Cybersecurity Research, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 176-77 (2008).
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contribute to a shared compendium of cybersecurity knowledge. The 
public and private sectors both have a dire need for improved 
cybersecurity research, but there is currently a dearth of trust 
between the two.14
In the cybersecurity context, one of the primary contributors to 
this lack of trust is the fear of information insecurity. The 
government does not want classified cyber threat information to 
become widely known, just like the private sector does not want 
trade secrets or consumer information to become public knowledge. 
The private sector has become especially adamant about protecting 
online privacy from potential government overreach over the last few 
years. In January 2012, public backlash against federal copyright
legislation called the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) culminated in a 
protest blackout of several popular websites, including Reddit and 
the English language version of Wikipedia.15 Opponents argued that 
SOPA posed a huge threat to Internet freedoms and would stifle the 
flow of information online.16 Shortly thereafter, SOPA failed in the 
House,17 and the Web heaved a collective sigh of relief.
Around the same time that the controversy over SOPA 
occurred, Congress was also proposing bills addressing cybersecurity 
issues. One of these, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection 
Act (CISPA), was introduced in the House in November 2011, and 
controversy surrounding the bill came to the public’s attention in 
April 2012.18 Organizations like the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
and the Center for Democracy and Technology came out against 
CISPA, criticizing its broad language.19 Opposition to CISPA was 
found on both sides of the political aisle, from Republican Ron Paul 
14. See Ellen Nakashima, NSA Tries to Regain Industry’s Trust to Work 
Cooperatively Against Cyber-Threats, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-tries-to-regain-
industrys-trust-to-work-cooperatively-against-cyber-threats/2013/10/09/93015af0-
2561-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html.
15. Ned Potter, Wikipedia Blackout: Websites Wikipedia, Reddit, Others Go 
Dark Wednesday to Protest SOPA, PIPA, ABC NEWS (Jan. 17, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wikipedia-blackout-websites-wikipedia-reddit-
dark-wednesday-protest/story?id=15373251#.T6v7wescPwA.
16. See id.
17. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).
18. Declan McCullagh, How CISPA Would Affect You (FAQ), CNET (Apr. 
27, 2012, 4:00 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31921_3-57422693-281/how-cispa-
would-affect-you-faq/.
19. Cyrus Farivar, CISPA Advances in House, as EFF Decries Bill’s 
Revisions, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2012, 4:51 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2012/04/cispa-advances-in-house-as-eff-decries-bills-revisions/.
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to the American Civil Liberties Union.20 The Internet had recently 
triumphed over SOPA, but now some of the same corporate interests 
that opposed SOPA were supporting CISPA, and bloggers were 
incensed.21 After several amendments, the House voted to pass 
CISPA on April 26, 2012, by a vote of 248 to 168.22 This led to 
collective unease on the part of Internet privacy proponents, but 
CISPA spent the rest of the 112th Congress in the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence.
On February 13, 2013, CISPA was reintroduced in the House 
of the 113th Congress, in a version nearly identical to the version 
passed by the House in the 112th Congress except for a few cosmetic 
changes.23 The day before CISPA’s reintroduction, President Obama 
issued an executive order setting forth a proposed program to support 
the cybersecurity efforts of privately owned critical infrastructure.24
The timing of these two actions indicated that the 113th Congress 
was likely to see a lot of cyber fireworks as the Republican House 
conflicted with the Democratic White House on this topic, in 
continuation of the previous term.25
However, the forward momentum for cybersecurity legislation 
seemed to grind to a halt after May 2013, perhaps because of the 
rapidly escalating controversy over government surveillance that 
20. Michelle Richardson, Opposition to CISPA Is Growing!, AM. C.L.
UNION (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security-technology-
and-liberty/opposition-cispa-growing.
21. See, e.g., Violet Blue, Google Helped with CISPA, Joins Cybersecurity 
Theatre, ZDNET (Apr. 18, 2012, 9:15 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/violetblue/google-helped-with-cispa-joins-
cybersecurity-theatre/1238.
22. See Keith Perine & Jennifer Martinez, House Passes CISPA Bill,
POLITICO (Apr. 27, 2012, 6:58 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/
0412/75670.html.
23. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. 
(2013).
24. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013). 
25. During the 112th Congress, the Obama Administration had opposed 
CISPA, instead throwing its support behind the version of the Cybersecurity Act that 
was introduced in the Senate in July 2012. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 3523–
CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING & PROTECTION ACT 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr3523r_2
0120425.pdf; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 3414–CYBERSECURITY ACT OF 2012 1
(2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/
legislative/sap/112/saps3414s_20120726.pdf.
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former contractor Edward Snowden brought to light.26 The Snowden 
leak is a perfect illustration of the information security fears of both 
the government and private sector. The leak also deepens our 
conviction that it is essential to refocus efforts on finding a balance 
between cybersecurity and digital privacy and fostering trust 
between the two sectors. CISPA will likely continue to be central to 
this debate, since Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD) introduced 
CISPA on the first day of the 114th Congress.27
In this Article, we will explore the importance of trust in the 
context of cybersecurity and privacy using a case study of CISPA,
Executive Order 13,636 (the Order), and Presidential Policy 
Directive 21 (PPD-21). Both the market and the law have failed to 
keep up with the threat, and there is an urgent need for a new 
legislative paradigm that balances privacy and security without 
relying on an ad hoc approach to cybersecurity crises. To meet this 
goal, we propose a new “circle of trust” framework to encourage the 
creation of legislation that will foster cooperation and trust between 
the public and private sectors. The circle of trust represents our idea 
that the most pertinent information should be collected into a 
compendium of vital information that is shared with properly vetted 
agencies and firms. An essential part of this circle of trust framework 
is that the participants should not be compelled to share information 
beyond what is necessary. Under this framework, both the 
government and the private sector will still have the autonomy to 
refuse to share certain classes of information. We believe that a 
strong sense of information control will enhance privacy and support 
intersectoral trust. In the absence of intersectoral cooperation and 
trust, however, cybersecurity failures threaten to cripple modern 
society, making the adoption of this framework of the utmost 
importance.
In Part I, we present a new conceptual framework for 
information sharing that balances concerns of privacy and security in 
a way that we hope will increase the level of trust between the 
government and the private sector on cybersecurity issues. In Part II, 
we examine CISPA and modern privacy law in the United States. In 
Part III, we examine the issue of presidential authority and discuss 
the Order and PPD-21. In Part IV, we present our recommendations 
concerning the application of our proposed framework to legislation 
26. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.
27. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
(2015).
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and executive action, with additional emphasis on the hazards of 
relying on a purely voluntary approach. 
I. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR BALANCING PRIVACY AND 
SECURITY
Debates of legal policy often turn on a perceived dichotomy 
between conflicting interests. Internet policy is no exception. In the 
SOPA example above, the dichotomy is between the interests of 
property and privacy. SOPA’s advocates emphasized the goal of 
protecting intellectual property rights online, while opponents were 
alarmed by the degree of invasion into private life that SOPA would 
authorize.28 A framework for balancing property and privacy is 
outside the scope of this Article. Instead, we focus on the ongoing 
quest to strike a balance between privacy and security. 
The idea of privacy in U.S. law became more pronounced 
around 1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published an 
article characterizing privacy as a “right to be let alone.”29 At its 
core, the article by Warren and Brandeis focused on the balance 
between privacy and the right of others to circulate information.30
Privacy law has evolved over the last 125 years, with the issues 
becoming even more complicated in the last twenty years as the 
Internet grew in popularity. With this Article, we hope to provide a 
conceptual framework for evaluating information-sharing regimes 
with the goal of balancing privacy and security and fostering 
cooperation between the public and private sectors, and to this end 
we use CISPA and the Order as a case study. 
Private information is held by both the private and public 
sectors, with each side keeping their respective private information 
secret from the other to the extent necessary and feasible. Private 
information held by the government may include classified 
information like sensitive military activities or ongoing government 
investigations. Private information held by private firms may include 
trade secrets, customer information, and projects under development. 
Whenever too much private information from either side is obtained 
without proper procedures being followed, controversies erupt.
28. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
29. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193, 193 (1890).
30. See id. at 195 (referring to the tension between the right to be let alone 
and the use of emerging technologies like “[i]nstantaneous photographs” to 
disseminate personal information). 
1484 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1475
In June 2013, former NSA contractor Edward Snowden leaked 
a large amount of information about previously undisclosed 
government surveillance activities undertaken for national security 
purposes.31 The disclosures represent the unauthorized release of 
private information held by the government, and the surveillance 
activities themselves represent the collection of private information 
held by private citizens without their consent. 
The conceptual framework that we encourage would consider 
the categories of private information held by both the government 
and the private sector, and the information-sharing program would 
be narrowly tailored to emphasize the categories of information that 
would be the most useful to the other side for improving 
cybersecurity, while excluding the categories of information that 
would put privacy or national security at risk. The following two 
figures are a visualization of the current status of open information 
sharing and the possible future of open information sharing under a 
regime like CISPA.32
FIGURE 1
31. Mirren Gidda, Edward Snowden and the NSA Files–Timeline,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2013, 5:54 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jun/23/edward-snowden-nsa-files-timeline.
32. We use the term “open information sharing” here as a contrast to 
secretive government surveillance or the unauthorized release of sensitive data. 
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Figure 1 illustrates a few major examples of types of 
information that the different sectors might wish to keep secret.33 By 
default, each side has exclusive access to their circle.34 Some 
information in the left circle is accessible to the private sector, either 
because it is routinely shared or because it can be obtained under the 
Freedom of Information Act or similar statutory regimes. However, 
in the interest of national security, some types of information would 
routinely be withheld. For example, while an agency may be 
forthcoming about recent attempts to hack into its systems, it may be 
a bad idea to give too much information about the specific 
vulnerability that was exploited. A privately owned utility company 
might benefit from information about the vulnerability, but the 
current paradigm does not have an efficient mechanism for public-
private cooperation in cyber threat information sharing.35
Information in the right circle could be accessible to the 
government through existing legal processes.36 If the FBI were 
currently investigating a pattern of intrusions, it could likely meet the 
relevance standard to subpoena relevant information from several 
companies.37 However, this is a very inefficient way of gathering the 
information because of informational asymmetry. The private 
companies know what information they have, while the government 
would have to ask. To remedy this informational asymmetry, one 
possibility is to encourage private firms to report intrusion attempts 
to law enforcement, but survey data from 2002 and 2004 indicate 
that only a minority of firms that experienced intrusions notified law 
enforcement.38 The reluctance to share may be because revealing 
vulnerabilities could harm a company’s reputation or make them into 
a more attractive target for hackers. This is a major reason why we 
33. See supra Figure 1.
34. It should be noted that organizations within the circles may also keep 
their information secret from others within the same circle. Intrasectoral information 
transfer could be the subject of future analysis, but our primary focus with this 
Article is on intersectoral sharing.
35. The National Cybersecurity Communications and Integration Center of 
the Department of Homeland Security is authorized to facilitate information-sharing 
agreements for cybersecurity purposes under the National Cybersecurity Protection 
Act of 2014, but this authorization is too narrow to effectively support a circle of 
trust. P.L. 113-282 (2014); see infra text accompanying note 76.
36. See supra Figure 1.
37. To obtain a subpoena, the government must show that the information 
sought is relevant to an ongoing investigation. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia & Susan 
Freiwald, Fourth Amendment Protection for Stored Email, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
121, 128.
38. See infra notes 316-17 and accompanying text.
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encourage an organized and largely anonymized system of disclosure 
for vulnerabilities and intrusions. Other information, like trade 
secrets, should be handled very carefully, with disclosure being 
strictly limited to government actors who could apply the 
information to improve the security of government systems. 
Currently, the problem with cybersecurity information in the 
United States is that there are many information silos and little to no 
transparency between the holders of the information. To have a more
effective approach to cyber defense, there should be a way to access
the information held in the silos of the different institutional arenas.
Information silos also exist for individual companies in the private
sector on the topic of vulnerabilities and cybersecurity. While having 
segregated data collections may have advantages in some 
circumstances, we argue that it has too many disadvantages in the 
context of cybersecurity to permit this to continue as the status quo.
Our “circle of trust” framework tries to address the disadvantages of 
siloed information.
When information flows from one silo to the other today, this 
may raise information-security concerns. This is particularly true 
when the information is flowing between the private and public 
sectors. Referring to Figure 1, when too much of the information 
goes from the right circle to the left circle, we might call it intrusive 
government surveillance.39 When too much of the information goes 
from the left circle to the right circle, we might call it a security 
breach. Each side could benefit from some of the information in each 
circle. But how should we do that without overshare? 
39. See supra Figure 1.
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FIGURE 2
Figure 2 illustrates our conceptual framework for combining 
the right types of private information without overshare to create a 
circle of trust.40 This is not an exhaustive list of categories for any of 
the circles, and the application of this framework should be analyzed 
very carefully. The shared information should be subject to stringent 
rules about secondary disclosures by the recipient, with stronger 
restrictions applying to more sensitive information. For example, 
private-sector recipients cannot disclose classified cyber threat data, 
and government recipients cannot disclose research information that 
is a trade secret. 
Ultimately, our proposed framework is about cultivating trust 
between the private and public sectors, and in its current form, 
legislation will likely be necessary. The goal of this conceptual 
framework is to guide the creation of a legislative paradigm based on 
fostering trust between the private and public sectors. We 
characterize the middle circle of Figure 2 as representing a circle of 
trust.41 We envision that the circle of trust will be managed by a 
trusted third party. When the public sector shares information with 
40. See supra Figure 2.
41. See supra Figure 2.
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the private sector, that encourages the private sector to trust the 
public sector and vice versa. Our proposed framework advances this 
notion of trust even further by keeping some information out of the 
central circle. Allowing both sides to preserve a degree of secrecy 
validates this circle of trust where public- and private-sector 
information intermingle, and assures participants that overreach by 
either side will be limited. This framework would capture the 
institutional advantages of the private and public sectors, provided 
that this legislative regime is crafted in such a way that the risks from 
developing the circle of trust are minimized.
As visualized in Figure 2, this conceptual framework would 
maintain government secrecy for classified military activities and 
geopolitical information, and would maintain private market secrecy 
for consumer information, including information about consumers’
online activities.42 In the middle oval, we have placed the types of 
information that we think could provide the clearest benefits to each 
sector when shared. Private cybersecurity researchers could benefit 
from information about intrusion attempts and details about 
vulnerabilities uncovered by government actors. Government 
agencies could benefit from up-to-date information about private 
cybersecurity innovations and the identification of vulnerabilities by 
private firms. Both sides could benefit from information about 
different security measures and their rate of success. Some existing 
laws would need to be revised to implement this proposal, such as 
the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, which currently may 
limit the ability of security researchers to share information between 
firms or with the government.43
This framework would not automatically give the general 
public access to lists of vulnerabilities in networks that were 
identified by government agencies. Instead, it would establish a 
circle of trust between the two sectors in order to support and 
improve the security of computers and networks, from Wall Street to 
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue and everywhere in between. A vital part 
of this framework would be the vetting of information recipients. 
Both CISPA and the Order provide a mechanism for qualified 
members of the private sector to obtain security clearances so that 
42. See supra Figure 2.
43. Burstein, supra note 13, at 170; Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for 
the Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from 
Cyber Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 335 (2013). Burstein states that 
“cybersecurity research currently faces a dearth of realistic, usable data to study 
modern-day threats.” Burstein, supra note 13, at 172.
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they can receive classified cybersecurity intelligence from the 
government.44 Another essential part of our framework is that there 
must be limits on secondary disclosure and secondary use of shared 
information.
As trust grows between the public and private sectors, and as 
the limits on secondary use of cybersecurity information are 
established, adopting this framework could have a possible domino 
effect on the issue of surveillance. If an effective framework is 
accepted for balancing privacy and security, and there is adequate 
transparency in the program, warrantless surveillance programs 
could become unnecessary. With more structure and a lack of 
identifying data, any information that raises a red flag could be 
further investigated with search warrants and other manners of 
protective legal process. While the first step into an open 
information-sharing model may look like it could endanger privacy, 
the end result could be a system with increased transparency where 
warrantless “fishing expedition” surveillance is a thing of the past. 
The “place where there is no darkness” that is cryptically mentioned 
in Orwell’s 1984 could be understood as a world without secrecy, 
where Big Brother sees all.45 Our framework would support a “place 
where there is no darkness” in the sense of a segregated space of 
transparent relations between properly vetted representatives of 
government and the private sector. This place of transparency and 
light would promote the right balance between light within and 
shadow without to preserve both security and secrecy.
II. THE CYBER INTELLIGENCE SHARING AND PROTECTION ACT
The first part of our case study examines the proposed 
legislation known as CISPA, with our primary concern being 
whether the proposed regime lines up with our circle of trust 
framework for information sharing.
A. CISPA and Other Introduced Cybersecurity Legislation
CISPA was introduced by Rep. Mike Rogers in both the 112th 
Congress and the 113th Congress,46 and by Rep. Dutch 
44. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
45. ORWELL, supra note 1, at 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
46. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. 
(2013).
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Ruppersberger in the 114th Congress.47 In the 112th Congress, 
CISPA joined twenty other bills that focused on cybersecurity issues, 
none of which made it to the President’s desk. Some of these bills 
touched on cybersecurity only tangentially, like the Broadband for 
First Responders Act of 2011, which would have required wireless 
public safety broadband networks to adopt appropriate cybersecurity 
measures.48 Several focused on the need for research and 
development in cybersecurity areas,49 on cybercrime,50 or on the need 
for education and awareness.51 Some would create a public-private 
partnership in the form of a formal organization to foster cooperation 
between the private sector and the government.52 Many focused on 
the vulnerability of critical infrastructure.53 Some of the bills also 
included amendments to the Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002,54 which governs the information security
practices of federal agencies. Several bills were of a fairly 
comprehensive nature, addressing many of the above issues.55
Two of the more comprehensive bills, the SECURE IT Act and
the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, were each introduced at least twice 
during the 112th Congress. Compared to these bills, CISPA was 
relatively narrow, focusing on the information-gathering process. 
However, CISPA was a much hotter topic than any version of the 
Cybersecurity Act or the SECURE IT Act because CISPA would 
create a regime where private firms would be encouraged to 
voluntarily share cyber threat information with the government. 
Many people feared that information sharing under CISPA would 
47. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
(2015). 
48. Broadband for First Responders Act of 2011, H.R. 607, 112th Cong.; 
Broadband for First Responders Act of 2011, S. 1040, 112th Cong.
49. E.g., PRECISE Act of 2011, H.R. 3674, 112th Cong.; SECURE IT Act, 
S. 2151, 112th Cong. (2012). 
50. E.g., Cyber Crime Protection Security Act, S. 2111, 112th Cong. 
(2012).
51. E.g., Cyber Security Public Awareness Act of 2011, S. 813, 112th 
Cong.
52. E.g., H.R. 3674 (proposing a “National Information Sharing 
Organization”); Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (proposing the use 
of existing public-private partnerships, like the “Critical Infrastructure Partnership 
Advisory Council” and appropriate information sharing and analysis centers).
53. E.g., Grid Cyber Security Act, S. 1342, 112th Cong. (2011); Homeland 
Security Cyber and Physical Infrastructure Protection Act of 2011, H.R. 174, 112th 
Cong.; Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 2105, 112th Cong.
54. E.g., SECURE IT Act of 2012, H.R. 4263, 112th Cong.; S. 2105.
55. S. 2105; S. 3414.
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include personal information and activity logs in a way that would 
“chill free speech” on the Internet.56
In the 113th Congress, CISPA again joined over twenty other 
bills that focused on cybersecurity. The SECURE IT Act appeared 
again, and the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 was 
originally introduced, under a different name, in July 201357 and was 
placed on the Senate legislative calendar a year later, in July 2014. 
Cybersecurity bills introduced in the 113th Congress were somewhat
narrower than the cybersecurity bills introduced in the 112th 
Congress. The Cyber Warrior Act of 2013 was an interesting bill, as 
it calls for the creation of “Cyber and Computer Network Incident 
Response Teams,” to consist of National Guard members in each 
state and the District of Columbia.58 Very similar versions of the 
Cyber Warrior Act were introduced in the House and Senate,59 but 
neither bill was enacted.
In the 113th Congress, CISPA was joined by two other bills
that focused on cyber threat information sharing60 and two other bills 
that focused on critical infrastructure or particularly sensitive targets 
that are often under private control.61 The Secure Chemical Facilities 
Act includes requirements concerning what the Secretary of 
Homeland Security must do with regard to security vulnerabilities 
uncovered at chemical facilities, including cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities.62 Congress also introduced bills pertaining to data 
security and security breaches.63 Some bills focused on cybersecurity 
funding and education, like the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 
2013.64 Several of the bills addressed the cybersecurity practices of 
56. Stop Online Spying Today, SAVE THE INTERNET,
http://act2.freepress.net/call/cispa_call/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
57. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 
Stat. 2971.
58. Cyber Warrior Act of 2013, H.R. 1640, 113th Cong.
59. Id.; Cyber Warrior Act of 2013, S. 658, 113th Cong.
60. Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2014, S. 2588, 113th Cong.; 
National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066. 
61. National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure Protection Act of 
2013, H.R. 3696, 113th Cong.; Secure Chemical Facilities Act, S. 68, 113th Cong. 
(2013).
62. S. 68.
63. Cyber Privacy Fortification Act of 2013, H.R. 1121, 113th Cong.; 
Federal Agency Data Breach Notification Act of 2014, H.R. 4215, 113th Cong.
64. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2013, H.R. 756, 113th Cong.
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government agencies, but did not affect the private sector.65 Cyber 
espionage from foreign actors was also the focus of several bills.66
As the above summary indicates, the 113th Congress 
introduced as many or more cybersecurity bills compared to the 
112th Congress. However, by the midterm elections in 2014, only 
three of the cybersecurity-focused bills had been passed by the 
originating chamber: CISPA,67 the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act 
of 2013,68 and the National Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Act of 2014.69 Two of the bills that passed in the House 
did so in April 2013, before the Snowden leak drew headlines. It was 
over a year after the Snowden leak before the House passed another 
cybersecurity bill, though several were introduced during that 
timeframe. The lack of progress on cybersecurity bills after the 
Snowden leak may have been due to a number of factors. Our theory 
is that because cybersecurity issues raise concerns about privacy, the 
Snowden leak and its ramifications for privacy made it less 
politically savvy to pursue cybersecurity.
After the midterm elections, however, the lame duck Congress 
had a few surprises up its sleeve.70 For our purposes, three especially 
significant cybersecurity-related bills were passed in December of 
2014 and signed by President Obama on December 18, 2014: 1) the 
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA),71
65. Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, Public L. No. 
113-283, 128 Stat. 3078; H.R. 4500, 113th Cong. (2014) (“To improve the 
management of cyber and information technology ranges and facilities of the 
Department of Defense, and for other purposes.”); DOD Cloud Security Act, H.R. 
4505, 113th Cong. (2014); Veterans Information Security Improvement Act, H.R. 
4370, 113th Cong. (2014); Executive Cyberspace Coordination Act of 2013, H.R. 
3032, 113th Cong. FISMA was passed by Congress in December of 2014 and was 
signed into law by the President. 
66. Deter Cyber Theft Act of 2014, S. 2384, 113th Cong.; Cyber Economic 
Espionage Accountability Act, H.R. 2281, 113th Cong. (2013); Deter Cyber Theft 
Act, S. 884, 113th Cong. (2013); Cyber Economic Espionage Accountability Act, S. 
1111, 113th. Cong. (2013).
67. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. 
(2013).
68. H.R. 756, 113th Cong. (2013) (as received in the Senate on April 17, 
2013).
69. H.R. 3696, 113th Cong. (2014) (as received in the Senate on July 29, 
2014).
70. For a review of recent congressional action on cybersecurity, see 
Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy? 38-45 (2015), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2548561. 
71. Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073. 
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2) the National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 (NCPA),72 and 
3) the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 (CEA).73 FISMA is 
an update to the older Federal Information Security Management 
Act, and focuses on the cybersecurity practices of federal agencies.74
NCPA codifies the functions of the National Cybersecurity and 
Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS).75 Like CISPA, the NCPA approaches 
cybersecurity from an information-sharing perspective, though the 
NCPA takes a somewhat narrow approach, focusing on the newly 
formed National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center (NCCIC) of the Department of Homeland Security.76 Finally, 
the CEA addresses a variety of topics like cybersecurity research and 
education, but for our purposes, its most significant contribution is 
Title I, which sets forth detailed guidance for the National Institute 
for Standards and Technology’s activities relating to cybersecurity 
standards,77 which we presume is intended as legislative oversight of
the Cybersecurity Framework drafted pursuant to President Obama’s 
Executive Order 13,636.
Meanwhile, the 114th Congress has been called into session, 
and CISPA is back, this time introduced by Rep. Dutch 
Ruppersberger (D-MD),78 who supported the bill in the 112th and 
113th sessions of Congress.79 Devastating cyberattacks have landed 
in headlines more often over the last few years, and the clarion call 
for stronger cybersecurity has grown louder. The cybersecurity bills 
that were enacted into law in the eleventh hour of the 113th Congress 
were the first major legislative actions on cybersecurity in over a 
decade, but they leave many questions unanswered. Supporters of 
CISPA in the 114th Congress may be hoping that the third time is the 
charm for this legislation.
Joining CISPA in the 114th Congress is the Cyber Threat 
Sharing Act of 2015, a bill which is nearly identical to a legislative 
proposal offered by the White House in January.80 This bill focuses 
72. Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066.
73. Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971.
74. Pub. L. No. 113-283, 128 Stat. 3073; see also 44 U.S.C. § 3551 (2012).
75. Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066.
76. Id. at § 3.
77. Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 Stat. 2971.
78. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong 
(2015). 
79. See infra note 182.
80. WHITE HOUSE, INFORMATION SHARING LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL (2015), 
available at 
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on information sharing, and unlike most recent actions on
cybersecurity, will allow for the private sector to voluntarily share 
“cyber threat indicators” with the federal government.81 The term 
“cyber threat indicator” is given a fairly narrow definition, singling 
out methods and vulnerabilities and using language that emphasizes 
malice.82 The White House explicitly states that the legislative 
proposal builds on important cybersecurity work in Congress, and 
the bill based on the proposal points to the CEA as a source of 
guidelines for developing mechanisms for the real-time sharing of 
cyber threat indicators.83
The NCPA and CEA have laid some of the legislative 
groundwork for strengthening cybersecurity and implementing 
Executive Order 13,636 and the Cybersecurity Framework, and the 
Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 could potentially advance 
cybersecurity policy closer to our proposed circle of trust framework,
though the latter bill would establish information-sharing within the 
NCCIC, rather than a trusted third party as we propose. But the 
legislative proposal enters a battlefield that is already filled with 
agendas and partisanship, and much can be learned by analyzing the 
progress of a similar information-sharing bill that has been raised in 
three separate congressional sessions. It is with this in mind that we 
present a case study of CISPA as an example of the politics and 
perceptions surrounding cybersecurity playing out on the national
stage. 
B. Text of CISPA
As written, CISPA would add § 1104 to the end of the National 
Security Act of 1947.84 CISPA is described in the preamble as an act 
“[t]o provide for the sharing of certain cyber threat intelligence and 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/updated-
information-sharing-legislative-proposal.pdf [hereinafter Information Sharing 
Legislative Proposal].
81. Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015, S. 456, 114th Cong.
82. Id. at § 2.
83. Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Securing Cyberspace—
President Obama Announces New Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal and Other 
Cybersecurity Efforts (Jan. 13, 2015), [hereinafter Securing Cyberspace], available 
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/13/securing-cyberspace
president-obama-announces-new-cybersecurity-legislat; Cyber Threat Sharing Act 
of 2015, S.456 § 2, 114th Cong. 
84. H.R. 234, § 3. For the sake of clarity, textual references to § 3 of the bill 
will refer to the provision’s placement in proposed § 1104. 
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cyber threat information between the intelligence community and 
cybersecurity entities, and for other purposes.”85 In the bill, “cyber 
threat intelligence” and “cyber threat information” have nearly 
identical definitions, except “cyber threat intelligence” is 
“intelligence in the possession of an element of the intelligence 
community” whereas “cyber threat information” does not contain a 
requirement for who is in possession.86 Thus, it is “cyber threat 
intelligence” if it is held by a member of government intelligence 
operations, and “cyber threat information” if held by anyone else. In 
other words, the fundamental goal of CISPA is to put information 
from both sides into the center circle of trust that we depicted in 
Figure 2.87
The text of CISPA implies an awareness of the privacy-security 
balance. Proposed § 1104(c)(3) clarifies that there is no quid pro quo 
implied, in that if the government shares information with a private 
entity, the private entity does not thereby incur an obligation to share 
information with the government.88 Proposed § 1104(f)(5) also 
includes language making it explicit that private entities will not be 
subject to any liability if they elect to not participate in voluntary 
actions pertaining to cyber threat information.89 Using the terms of 
our theoretical framework, CISPA makes it explicit that the private 
sector is not required to move any information into the circle of 
trust.90
Under proposed § 1104(c)(1), once cyber threat information 
has been shared with the federal government, that information can be 
used “for cybersecurity purposes,” to “investigat[e] and 
prosecut[e] . . . cybersecurity crimes” and “crimes involving . . . 
danger of death or serious bodily harm,” to “protect[] . . . individuals 
from . . . danger of death or serious bodily harm,” to protect national 
security, and to “protect[] . . . minors from . . . serious threats.”91
However, proposed § 1104(b)(2)(D)(iii) explicitly prohibits the 
government from using this information “for regulatory purposes.”92
85. Id. pmbl.
86. Id. § 3.
87. See supra Figure 2.
88. H.R. 234, § 3. 
89. Id.
90. The voluntary sharing of cyber threat information is also a focus of 
President Obama’s legislative proposal that the White House announced in January 
2015. Securing Cyberspace, supra note 80.
91. Id.
92. Id.
1496 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1475
This places CISPA roughly in line with our proposal that there 
should be limits to secondary disclosure or secondary use of the 
information, though we would also encourage this sort of regime to 
place stricter limits on the secondary use and disclosure of more 
sensitive information.
There are a number of deficiencies in CISPA’s current form 
that should be amended to make it more consistent with our circle of 
trust framework, and we make detailed suggestions to this effect in 
Section IV.B. The remainder of this Part places CISPA in context in 
a way that we hope will increase support for CISPA and similar 
legislation. First, we emphasize CISPA’s place in the full global 
context of cybersecurity issues. Second, we examine how CISPA fits 
in the context of privacy law in the United States, with special 
emphasis on the voluntary disclosure provisions of the Stored 
Communications Act. Third, we place CISPA into its own context—
that is, placing the controversial provisions of CISPA in the context 
of the more protective provisions of CISPA. 
C. The Cybersecurity Context of CISPA
The threat that CISPA addresses goes far beyond hacker 
collectives like Anonymous and Lulzsec.93 In the House Report, the 
legislators explicitly refer to the threats posed to domestic systems 
by cyber intrusions from foreign governments.94 These concerns are 
not baseless paranoia, but are instead based on threats that have 
already been seen on the world stage. Hackers located in China have 
been blamed for cyberattacks on major U.S. news organizations like 
the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Wall Street 
Journal.95 In May 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice indicted five 
Chinese military hackers, making history as the first time that a state 
actor has been charged with hacking and related economic 
93. See Carole Cadwalladr, We Are Anonymous: Inside the Hacker World 
of Lulzsec, Anonymous and the Global Cyber Insurgency by Parmy Olson–Review,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/aug/18/
we-are-anonymous-parmy-olson-review.
94. H.R. REP. NO. 112-445, at 5 (2012) (noting that a review of a number of 
issues concluded that “a number of advanced nation-state actors are actively 
engaged in a series of wide-ranging, aggressive efforts to penetrate American 
computer systems and networks”).
95. See Siobhan Gorman, Devlin Barrett & Danny Yadron, Chinese 
Hackers Hit U.S. Media, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 31, 2013, 8:28 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323926104578276202952260718.
html.
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espionage.96 The United States and Israel are alleged to have worked 
together to develop Stuxnet,97 and it is fairly likely that more cyber 
weapons will emerge that can target industrial control systems. Some 
nations already have sections of their militaries devoted to cyber 
offense.98
Cyberattacks pose a danger to critical infrastructure like power 
grids and water treatment plants.99 In 2007, researchers conducted a 
test at Idaho National Laboratories, commonly called the “Aurora 
Generator Test.”100 The Aurora Test revealed that it was possible for 
a hacker to use malicious commands to cause a power generator 
turbine to overheat and damage the equipment, showing the very real 
potential for a cyberattack to act like a physical attack.101 Stuxnet 
demonstrated this in real space. One reason that Stuxnet was such an 
effective cyber weapon was because it caused the infected control 
system to make the centrifuges run at speeds well outside “their 
specified operating range,” while also “disguis[ing] the disruption”
so that it would not be noticed by system operators.102 Before being 
discovered in the summer of 2010, Stuxnet had been operating for at 
least a year undetected, and during that time it is alleged to have 
destroyed hundreds of rotating centrifuges, in addition to causing 
severe damage to the rotating steam turbine at an Iranian nuclear 
power plant.103
96. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military 
Hackers for Cyber Espionage Against U.S. Corporations and a Labor Organization 
for Commercial Advantage (May 19, 2014), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2014/May/14-ag-528.html.
97. The Meaning of Stuxnet, ECONOMIST (Sept. 30, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17147862; see also Pam Benson, Computer Virus 
Stuxnet a ‘Game Changer,’ DHS Official Tells Senate, CNN (Nov. 18, 2010, 6:21 
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/11/17/stuxnet.virus/index.html. Stuxnet 
is a sophisticated cyber weapon that was designed to exploit vulnerabilities in 
industrial control systems—specifically, systems used for processing uranium in 
Iranian nuclear facilities. The Meaning of Stuxnet, supra.
98. Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-
Defense and Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 457 (2012).
99. See Zhang, supra note 43, at 323.
100. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32114, BOTNETS,
CYBERCRIME, AND CYBERTERRORISM: VULNERABILITIES AND POLICY ISSUES FOR 
CONGRESS 20 (2008).
101. Id.
102. Roland L. Trope & Stephen J. Humes, Before Rolling Blackouts Begin: 
Briefing Boards on Cyber Attacks That Target and Degrade the Grid, 40 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 647, 675 (2014).
103. Id. at 675-76; see also Iran Confirms Stuxnet Worm Halted Centrifuges,
CBSNEWS (Nov. 29, 2010, 3:19 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
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Cyber operations can take many forms and serve many 
purposes. Cyberattacks may be used to complement conventional 
war efforts. In 2008, cyberattacks against Georgian government 
websites coincided with armed conflict between Russia and Georgia, 
making it difficult for the Georgian government to communicate 
with the public about the conflict.104 A second possible application of 
cyber threats is cyber espionage. Aggressive malware known as 
Snake has been found on computers in Ukraine and appears to have 
been targeting government agencies, stealing information, and 
allowing attackers to access the infected computer remotely.105 Some 
cyber operations could be classified as weapons under international 
law because they cause physical damage to their targets. In 2010, the 
Stuxnet worm exploited four zero-day vulnerabilities to cause
significant physical damage to centrifuges in Iran.106 As many as 
one-fifth of Iran’s centrifuges may have been destroyed,107 though 
Iranian officials have previously stated that the damage was not as 
extensive as some have estimated. 
While complementing conventional warfare sounds dangerous, 
and pervasive cyber espionage is alarming, the weaponization of 
cyber threats is the most disturbing development. After the news of 
Stuxnet’s origin broke, experts in foreign policy and cyber conflict 
expressed unease about the beginning of a cyber “arms race.”108 This 
reference echoes the historical arms race of nuclear weapon 
development, but as a practical matter, cyber weapon research is 
likely to progress much faster than nuclear weapon research. Unlike 
a nuclear weapon, which leaves very few clues in the wake of its 
destruction, cyber weapons remain largely intact unless part of the 
2010/11/29/world/main7100197.shtml; Nicole Perlroth, Researchers Find Clues in 
Malware, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/31/technology/researchers-link-flame-virus-to-stuxnet-and-duqu.html?_r=0.
104. Matthew J. Sklerov, Solving the Dilemma of State Responses to 
Cyberattacks: A Justification for the Use of Active Defenses Against States Who 
Neglect Their Duty to Prevent, 201 MIL. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (2009).
105. David E. Sanger & Steven Erlanger, Suspicion Falls on Russia as 
‘Snake’ Cyberattacks Target Ukraine’s Government, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/09/world/europe/suspicion-falls-on-russia-as-
snake-cyberattacks-target-ukraines-government.html?_r=1.
106. Jarred Shearer, W32.Stuxnet, SYMANTEC (Feb. 26, 2013, 7:15 PM),
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-
99. A zero-day vulnerability is a security flaw that was unknown to the vendor until 
it was exploited. See id.
107. Perlroth, supra note 103.
108. E.g., Misha Glenny, A Weapon We Can’t Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 
2012, at A19.
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code is written to cause the program to self-destruct or stop working 
upon the fulfillment of a condition. For example, Stuxnet’s
expiration date was June 24, 2012, and no new infections could 
occur after that date.109 However, there is still a good chance that the 
code can be analyzed. Even if the efforts in creating Stuxnet and 
similar cyber weapons were unique, by releasing Stuxnet and similar 
creations “into the wild,” the creator makes these cyber weapons 
available for reverse engineering to allow third parties to recreate the 
effects.110
Stuxnet is publicly regarded as the first sophisticated cyber
weapon that specifically targets industrial control systems.111 These 
control systems are commonly referred to as Supervisory Control 
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, and are typically used in 
the operation of critical infrastructure.112 Stuxnet underscores the 
vulnerability of SCADA systems to cyberattacks and the importance 
of protecting these systems from attacks. It would not be an 
overstatement to say that threats against critical infrastructure are 
threats against national security. An attack that takes advantage of a 
vulnerability in the power grid could result in massive power 
outages.113 If a water treatment facility is the target of a cyberattack, 
that attack could lead to untreated sewage being dumped in a public 
water supply.114 Cyberattacks against transportation infrastructure 
could result in train collisions or even plane crashes.115 These sorts of 
attacks could potentially be perpetrated from hundreds or thousands 
of miles away. 
109. William Jackson, Stuxnet Shut Down by Its Own Kill Switch, GCN 
(June 26, 2012), http://gcn.com/Articles/2012/06/26/Stuxnet-demise-expiration-
date.aspx.
110. See Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Accelerating Cyberweapon Research,
WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 2012), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/us-accelerating-cyberweapon-research/2012/03/13/gIQAMR
GVLS_story.html (noting the danger that a target could reverse engineer a cyber 
weapon). 
111. Nicolas Falliere, Stuxnet Introduces the First Known Rootkit for 
Industrial Control Systems, SYMANTEC (Jan. 23, 2014, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/stuxnet-introduces-first-known-rootkit-
scada-devices.
112. Sklerov, supra note 104, at 19.
113. Brian Wingfield, Power-Grid Cyber Attack Seen Leaving Millions in 
Dark for Months, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-02-01/cyber-attack-on-u-s-power-grid-seen-leaving-millions-in-dark-for-
months.html.
114. Sklerov, supra note 104, at 20.
115. Id.
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One can easily see why the government should be involved in 
protecting critical infrastructure, but a significant systemic issue 
stands in the way: Most critical infrastructure in the United States is 
owned and operated by members of the private sector.116 This can 
make it difficult for government actors to share classified cyber 
threat information with the members of the private sector who would 
benefit the most. Addressing this difficulty by setting out procedures 
for the sharing of classified information with “utilities” is one of the 
most beneficial provisions of CISPA.117
We theorize that if the public were more informed about the 
threats posed by this new “cyber arms race” and legislation’s
potential role in protecting critical infrastructure, public opinion 
about legislation like CISPA might shift. We do not encourage the 
use of alarmist rhetoric to frighten citizens into supporting a bill that 
would restrict civil liberties, but at the same time, citizens should be 
informed about the possible threats so that an educated discourse can 
occur. In our view, it would facilitate this discourse to ensure that the 
public is informed about realistic threats in the cyber realm and about 
the current state of privacy law in the United States. Thus, it is to the 
privacy law context of CISPA that we now turn.
D. The Legal Context of CISPA 
The most vocal criticisms of CISPA typically turned on the 
provisions that potentially allow private actors to share information 
about citizens with the government.118 These provisions are what 
really set CISPA apart from recently enacted legislation like the 
NCPA.119 CISPA would immunize these actors from legal liability if 
the actors had a good faith basis for identifying information as 
“cyber threat information” and sharing it with the government, as 
116. Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions 
Regarding the Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 233, 
240 (2010) (estimating that 85% of CNI is owned by the private sector).
117. See Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th 
Cong. § 3 (2015). Similar benefits are also provided by the newly enacted NCPA, 
though the NCPA’s language uses the broader term “critical infrastructure.” 
National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, § 7, 128 Stat. 
3066, 3070.
118. McCullagh, supra note 18. President Obama’s new legislative proposal 
also allows the private sector to share information about cyber threats with the 
government. Securing Cyberspace, supra note 80.
119. See text accompanying note 76.
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permitted under that section.120 In proposed § 1104(b), private 
entities are permitted to disclose information to the federal 
government “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law.”121 The 
“notwithstanding” language is perhaps the most troubling provision 
of CISPA because it explicitly removes information shared under 
CISPA from the coverage of other laws aimed at protecting privacy. 
Critics of this voluntary sharing provision and the immunization 
from legal liability assert that it gives private companies a license to 
violate the privacy rights of consumers, free from any oversight of 
privacy law.122
The idea that CISPA explicitly removes this information from 
the purview of other privacy laws sounds worrisome on its face, but 
does it really make a substantial difference? If the “notwithstanding”
language was not included in the final bill, what privacy laws would 
actually apply to the content covered by CISPA? There are two main
potential sources: the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, and 
statutes.
1. The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable 
government searches,123 and compliance with the Fourth Amendment 
typically requires the government to get a warrant before obtaining
evidence when there is a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”124 On 
June 25, 2014, the Supreme Court issued a decision in the case of 
Riley v. California concerning the “search incident” exception to the 
warrant requirement and its application to cell phone data.125 In Riley,
the Supreme Court made it very clear that data stored on a cell phone 
is protected by the Fourth Amendment, and that police cannot search 
an arrestee’s cell phone as casually and informally as they might flip 
through a notepad found in an arrestee’s pocket.126 The Court 
essentially acknowledged in Riley that the expectation of privacy that 
necessitates a search warrant applies to cell phone data even when 
120. H.R. 234, § 3.
121. Id.
122. See McCullagh, supra note 18 (quoting Rep. Jared Polis as saying that 
CISPA would “‘waive every single privacy law ever enacted in the name of 
cybersecurity’”).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
124. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).
125. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480, 2482 (2014).
126. Id. at 2493.
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the holder of the cell phone has been arrested. If police want to 
search through the potentially dozens of gigabytes of text, music, 
emails, and videos stored on an arrestee’s cell phone, the Riley Court 
explicitly directs them to get a warrant. 
Because it is limited to the search incident warrant exception
and focuses on data stored on a device, the Fourth Amendment 
reasoning of Riley likely would not prevent legislation like CISPA 
from operating on the Internet where information is being 
transferred. Some may worry that CISPA allows the government to 
subvert the warrant requirement without relying on an established 
exception like search incident. However, there are two problems with 
applying the Fourth Amendment to information covered by CISPA: 
(1) the fact that sharing is voluntary, and (2) the potential application 
of the third-party doctrine. The first hurdle for Fourth Amendment 
protection is that voluntary sharing initiated by private companies, 
even when permitted by statute, is likely not considered a state 
action, and thus the information sharing would not implicate the 
Fourth Amendment.127
Even if information sharing under CISPA did potentially 
implicate the Fourth Amendment as state action, those protections 
only apply when a “reasonable expectation of privacy” exists. The 
Supreme Court has not yet conclusively addressed the issue of a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in data being moved across the 
Internet. Riley shows that when data is stored on a device like a cell 
phone, police cannot rely on the search incident warrant exception to 
search that device.128 But does it violate your reasonable expectation 
of privacy if law enforcement obtains your information from a 
service provider? Under the third-party doctrine, there is no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in information disclosed to a third 
party if the government requests that information from the third-
party recipient.129 Many legal scholars worry that the third-party 
doctrine of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence may preclude any 
127. See United States v. Richardson, 607 F.3d 357, 364 (4th Cir. 2010) 
(holding that an Internet Service Provider (ISP) was not a state actor with respect to 
the ISP’s search that led to the discovery of child pornography that the ISP was then 
required by statute to disclose). 
128. 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95.
129. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973) (finding no 
reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records turned over to an accountant 
for tax return purposes); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976) 
(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in financial records disclosed to a 
financial institution in the ordinary course of business).
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Fourth Amendment protection for information stored or transmitted 
online because third parties inherently must process information 
stored and transmitted over the Internet.130
Case law continues to develop on this point. In United States v. 
Warshak, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the third-party doctrine 
does not apply to an email service because that service is an 
intermediary of the communication instead of a recipient.131
However, the content of terms-of-service agreements might 
eliminate a reasonable expectation of privacy if such agreement 
gives the service provider broad rights to monitor traffic.132 Any 
protection that the Fourth Amendment provides to information 
covered by CISPA may therefore be reduced to the extent that 
service providers reserve the right to monitor traffic and activity on 
the service. Thus, even if CISPA’s voluntary sharing provisions do 
not preclude the application of the Fourth Amendment, the third-
party doctrine and the service provider’s own privacy policy and 
terms of service may still reduce or eliminate a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the information covered by CISPA. 
The degree of protection offered to online communications 
under the Fourth Amendment is an open question, and it is unclear 
what the Supreme Court will conclude on this issue. In United States 
v. Jones, the Supreme Court considered whether actions by law 
enforcement in attaching a GPS device to a suspect’s automobile 
violated the Fourth Amendment.133 Because of the nature of GPS and 
the similarity of GPS technology to other Internet technologies, the 
Jones case could have had implications for the current debate about a 
reasonable expectation of privacy online. However, though the 
majority in Jones concluded that the placement of a GPS device on a 
car violated the Fourth Amendment, this conclusion was based on a 
130. E.g., Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment 
in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21 ALB.
L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 173-74 (2011); David S. Barnhill, Cloud Computing and 
Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 621, 643 (2010). But see Katherine J. Strandburg, Home, Home on the 
Web and Other Fourth Amendment Implications of Technosocial Change, 70 MD. L.
REV. 614, 634 (2011) (noting that some courts are moving away from a more 
aggressive third-party doctrine when interpreting the Fourth Amendment). 
131. 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010).
132. Id. at 287; see also In re § 2703(d) Order, 787 F. Supp. 2d 430, 440 
(E.D. Va. 2011) (finding no legitimate Fourth Amendment privacy interest in an IP 
address where Twitter’s privacy policy states that Twitter will log users’ IP 
addresses).
133. 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
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theory of trespass rather than on a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.134 Similarly, in City of Ontario v. Quon, the Supreme Court 
assumed, but did not conclusively determine, that text messages 
obtained from a service provider would be protected by the Fourth 
Amendment.135 During the oral arguments in Quon, Justice Roberts 
indicated confusion about how electronic messaging works, and 
expressed his initial thought that the Fourth Amendment would not 
apply if such messages were handled by a third party during 
transit.136 The non-conclusory assumption of Fourth Amendment 
application to text messages held by a third party thus indicates that 
the Supreme Court recognizes the existence of a controversy, but is 
not yet willing to weigh in authoritatively on this point. 
2. Privacy Statutes and the Stored Communications Act
If the Fourth Amendment does not apply, either because the 
information sharing is voluntary or because of the third-party 
doctrine, that would leave existing statutory regimes to fill in the 
gaps and protect online privacy when the Constitution cannot. This 
gap-filling purpose was one of the initial reasons for the enactment 
of the Stored Communications Act,137 which we examine in more 
detail below.
Statutory privacy law in the United States is very sector-
specific. The sharing of consumer credit information,138 health 
information,139 and video rental histories140 are all regulated, but 
many other sectors are not restricted in how and when they can share 
consumer information. Proposed § 1104(c)(4) of CISPA identifies 
certain classes of “sensitive personal documents” that, if shared by 
the private sector under other provisions of CISPA, may not be used 
134. Id. at 949. 
135. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010).
136. Transcript of Oral Argument at 48-50, Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (No. 08-
1332), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_
transcripts/08-1332.pdf (exemplifying the confusion of Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Scalia as to how wireless communications are transmitted).
137. See Casey Perry, Recent Development, U.S. v. Warshak: Will Fourth 
Amendment Protection Be Delivered to Your Inbox?, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 345, 349 
(2011) (noting that the ECPA supplements the Fourth Amendment).
138. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (2012).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012) (addressing the “[w]rongful disclosure of 
individually identifiable health information”).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2012).
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by the federal government.141 This category includes information 
concerning library circulation, book sales, firearms sales, tax returns, 
education, and medical records.142 This might mitigate some of the 
dangers inherent in circumventing sector-specific privacy laws, 
though arguably it does not go far enough since it only prohibits use 
by the federal government and does not address use by other private 
parties or by state or local governments. To improve this prohibition 
on use, the language should be amended to cover personally 
identifiable information and address use by parties other than the 
federal government. This is important in order to establish the circle 
of trust that we emphasize in our conceptual framework in Part I.
However, even as currently written, CISPA’s effects on sector-
specific privacy laws are likely to be fairly narrow because the laws 
themselves are narrow. The main statute of general applicability that 
applies to electronic communications is the Stored Communications 
Act of 1986 (SCA).143 Thus, when CISPA opponents assert that 
CISPA allows companies to circumvent current privacy law, 
circumvention of the SCA is the broadest and most potentially 
problematic element. 
The SCA was enacted as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA). The SCA addresses the 
voluntary disclosure of electronic communications in § 2702 of Title 
18 and the compelled disclosure of electronic communications in 
§ 2703.144 Because CISPA is explicit that the government cannot 
compel the production of cyber threat information from members of 
the private sector, § 2703 is not in issue.
a. Electronic Communication Services and Remote 
Computing Services
The SCA was enacted in 1986 and has not been substantially 
amended since then. The SCA still contains a fairly archaic 
distinction between electronic communication services (ECS) and 
remote computing services (RCS). Under the SCA, the definition for 
ECS is the same as under the Wiretap Act, where it is defined as 
“any service which provides to users thereof the ability to send or 
141. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
142. Id.
143. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712.
144. Id. §§ 2702-2703.
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receive wire or electronic communications.”145 RCS is defined as 
“the provision to the public of computer storage or processing 
services by means of an electronic communications system.”146
Both of these definitions have been unchanged since 1986, 
even though technology and business models have advanced 
significantly. The ECS provisions are generally viewed as applying 
to electronic messaging, especially email. In the mid-1980s, the 
transfer of email was fairly fragmented, with communications being 
transmitted from server to server, stored at various locations 
temporarily during the trip before being downloaded by the 
recipient.147 Modern email is transmitted very differently, including 
through the use of the Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP),148
with many consumers accessing messages solely via webmail. The 
category of RCS was intended to address the business model where 
companies outsourced a lot of storage and processing functions due 
to the high cost of doing this in house.149 More powerful, mobile, and 
accessible technologies have rendered this particular business model 
largely moot. 
There is a lot of overlap between the concepts of ECS and RCS 
today because so many activities take place entirely online, including 
the sending and storage of email. This overlap is significant because 
the strength of protections under the SCA turns on the distinction 
between ECS and RCS. The difference between these two categories 
of services is especially important in the compelled disclosure 
provisions of § 2703 because the type of service determines the type 
of procedure required for the government to compel information. As 
noted above, however, CISPA’s emphasis on voluntary disclosure 
prevents the provisions of § 2703 from applying. Thus, to the extent 
that opponents of CISPA warn that CISPA allows the government to 
obtain personal information without a warrant, a warrant would 
likely not be required under the SCA anyway because the disclosure 
is voluntary instead of compelled. In the absence of the 
“notwithstanding” language, therefore, the only provisions of the 
SCA that would apply would be the provisions of § 2702. 
145. Id. § 2510(15).
146. Id. § 2711(2).
147. William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing 
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1205-06 (2010).
148. See IMAP and POP, U. MINN., http://it.umn.edu/imap-and-pop (last 
visited Jan. 5, 2015).
149. Robison, supra note 147, at 1206-07.
Creating a “Circle of Trust” to Further Digital Privacy 1507
b. Disclosures and Exceptions Under § 2702
Under § 2702(a), communication contents held by an ECS 
provider cannot be disclosed to anyone unless an exception 
applies.150 Communications carried or maintained by an RCS 
provider cannot be disclosed without an exception either, though the
most common interpretation of § 2702(a)(2) is that the RCS 
provision requires carriage or maintenance to be “solely for the 
purpose of providing storage or computer processing services.”151
This qualification language for RCS providers was likely intended to 
address possible issues involving the third-party doctrine of the 
Fourth Amendment. This qualification has not aged well as 
technology has developed, given that it is a common practice for 
providers to reserve secondary use rights to customer data, such as 
for marketing purposes. Regardless of whether a service qualifies as 
ECS or RCS, non-content information, such as the identity of the 
sender or recipient of a message, cannot be shared with the 
government unless an exception applies.152
The requirement that RCS providers only have access to 
information for limited purposes will likely prove to be a thorny 
issue in the near future, especially for customers of companies that 
provide free services in exchange for permission to share customer 
information with third-party advertisers. If a service provider is not
an ECS provider, but also cannot be an RCS provider because the 
provider has the authority to access customer information for other 
purposes, then 2702(a) would likely not prohibit that provider from 
voluntarily disclosing customer information to the government. In 
that situation, CISPA’s “notwithstanding” provision would have no 
effect because the SCA would not apply anyway. 
Whether a provider qualifies under the ECS or RCS terms is a 
very complicated issue that is the subject of disagreements between 
150. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(1).
151. Id. § 2702(a)(2)(B). An often overlooked part of § 2702(a)(2)(B) is the 
clause that follows the above quote, which reads “if the provider is not authorized 
the contents of any such communications for purposes of providing any services 
other than storage or computer process” (emphasis added). This implies that if the 
RCS provider is authorized to access communications for other purposes, 
§ 2702(a)(2)(B) is inapplicable. However, for the purposes of this Section, we will 
accept the currently prevailing interpretation as expressed in Flagg v. City of 
Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 358-59 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
152. Id. § 2710(a)(3), (b).
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courts.153 Although this is an open question, with eligibility as an 
RCS provider being especially thorny, we will assume for the sake of 
argument that any private company that shares information under 
CISPA would be bound by the terms of the SCA in the absence of 
the “notwithstanding” language of proposed § 1104(b). Thus, for 
these companies to share information on a voluntary basis, an 
exception under § 2702(b) would need to apply. The most relevant 
exceptions for voluntary disclosure are when lawful consent is 
obtained from qualified parties, when disclosure is made to law 
enforcement after the service provider “inadvertently obtained”
communication contents pertaining to the commission of a crime,
and when disclosure is required because of an emergency.154
The privacy policies of most services on the Internet reserve to 
the company a right to disclose information to the government. 
Depending on the wording of provisions like this, one might argue 
that the company has obtained the lawful consent to disclose 
information when the consumer consents to the privacy policy. 
However, this exception is largely inapplicable because most of 
these provisions include language about the disclosure being in 
response to lawful requests, and sharing under CISPA would be
voluntary and not likely to be accompanied by a request that can 
compel disclosure. The exception for communications “inadvertently 
obtained” might permit CISPA disclosures by a service provider that 
discovered a system compromise while conducting maintenance, but
this category of disclosures is likely to be fairly narrow in terms of 
its effects on privacy.155
The emergency exception, on the other hand, is much broader. 
Under the emergency exception of the SCA, a provider with a good 
faith belief that there is “an emergency involving danger of death or 
serious physical injury to any person” may disclose to a 
governmental entity communications relating to the emergency.156
This emergency exception was added in 2001 as part of the USA 
153. Compare Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 902 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (holding that an archive of text messages was for backup protection 
purposes and thus the service was an ECS), rev’d, City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 560 
U.S. 746 (2010), with Flagg ex rel. Bond v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346, 363 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (holding that an archive of text messages was for storage 
purposes and thus the service was an RCS). 
154. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(3), (7), (8).
155. See id. § 2702(b)(7).
156. Id. § 2702(b)(8).
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PATRIOT Act157 and was amended to its current form by the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002.158 Congress likely recognized in 
passing this amendment to the SCA that emergency disclosure 
provisions can be exploited. This awareness is reflected in the 
inclusion of reporting requirements. In § 2702(d), Congress requires 
the Attorney General to submit an annual report to Congress listing 
the number of instances of emergency disclosures under that section 
and also requires this report to summarize the basis for disclosure in 
instances where investigations relating to the voluntary disclosure 
did not result in criminal charges being filed.159
The fact that the emergency exception was initially introduced 
with the USA PATRIOT Act should raise a few civil libertarian 
eyebrows, especially considering how broad it is in its current form.
For instance, with the current language of the emergency exception 
of § 2702, a provider need only have a good faith belief that an 
emergency exists.160 There is also no time-related language in this 
emergency exception, such as requirements that the threat of 
physical harm be “imminent.” The emergency disclosure exception 
is an example of security being given more weight than privacy in 
the ongoing back-and-forth quest for a balance between privacy and 
security. Relying on an emergency exception would be undesirable 
in our circle of trust framework, which we believe should be 
established and practiced before an emergency so that it will work 
more efficiently and with stronger privacy guidelines when an 
emergency occurs.
157. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 212, 115 Stat. 272, 284.
158. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 225(d)(1)(D), 
116 Stat. 2135, 2157 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (2012)). The 
language in the PATRIOT Act permitted a provider to disclose information in the 
event of an emergency if the provider “reasonably believes” that there is such an 
emergency, § 212, 115 Stat. at 285, whereas the language in the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002 required only a “good faith” belief that such an emergency exists, 
§ 225(d)(1)(D), 116 Stat. at 2157.
159. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(d).
160. Id. § 2702(b)(8).
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c. Applying the SCA to CISPA
CISPA’s opponents generally cite concerns about civil liberties 
when opposing the voluntary disclosure language of CISPA,161 but 
they do not acknowledge that there is statutory precedent for these 
provisions. We argue that those concerned with CISPA and civil 
liberties should focus on this underlying statute. There are at least 
three reasons to view CISPA as either an extension of or at least 
closely related to the emergency disclosures exception of the SCA: 
(1) the potential harms that could flow from cyberattacks, which both 
seek to address; (2) the similar “good faith” provisions in the two; 
and (3) the presence in both of annual reporting requirements. Taken 
together, these features suggest that analyzing CISPA separately 
from the SCA paints an incomplete picture of the dominant policy 
approach to cybersecurity.
First, we noted above that cybersecurity threats pose substantial 
dangers to people, not just their computers, especially if the attacks 
are on critical infrastructure. Thus, it would not be an unreasonable 
extension of the emergency-disclosures exception to view this 
exception in the SCA as covering cyber threats against critical 
infrastructure. CISPA itself contains explicit terms allowing the 
government to use cyber threat information to protect individuals 
from “the danger of death or serious bodily harm” in proposed 
§ 1104(c)(1)(C).162 This provision addressing proper use of cyber 
threat information thus echoes the emergency disclosure exception 
under the SCA.163
Second, in proposed § 1104(b)(3), entities that share 
information with the government under CISPA are exempted from 
liability if they act in good faith in identifying, obtaining, and 
disclosing cyber threat information.164 This good faith liability 
exemption parallels the good faith belief language of the emergency 
exception in § 2702(b)(8) of the SCA. 
Third, like the emergency disclosure reporting requirement 
under § 2702(d) of the SCA, CISPA also includes an annual 
161. See, e.g., Michelle Richardson, CISPA Remains Fatally Flawed After 
Secret Committee Markup, ACLU (Apr. 12, 2013, 12:20 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security-free-
speech/cispa-remains-fatally-flawed-after-secret.
162. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
163. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(8). 
164. H.R. 234, § 3.
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reporting requirement to keep Congress informed of the type and use 
of voluntary disclosures and control possible abuse of the system.165
The reports must include, among other things, “appropriate metrics 
to determine the impact of the sharing of such information with the 
Federal Government on privacy and civil liberties.”166
The strongest argument against CISPA, that is, the broad 
permission it gives for private entities to disclose consumer 
information notwithstanding other provisions of law, is thus 
overstated. This argument assumes that if modern privacy law did
apply, it would limit CISPA’s reach. This argument largely ignores 
two things: (1) the ambiguity of the application of the Fourth 
Amendment to information subject to disclosure under CISPA; and 
(2) the strong parallels between the voluntary disclosure provisions 
of CISPA and the emergency disclosure exception of the SCA. 
The House Report of CISPA during the 112th Congress does 
not mention the SCA, indicating that the House members drafting it 
may have given inadequate consideration to CISPA’s relationship 
with the SCA.167 During the floor debate before the House, Rep. 
Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) expressed his concerns that CISPA’s
voluntary sharing provisions supersede “the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and the Wiretap Act.”168
However, this concern was not addressed in a rebuttal. 
In our proposal, we suggest striking the “notwithstanding”
language that precludes application of existing privacy law, but we 
also suggest amending CISPA to contain explicit references to 
§ 2702 of the SCA if the voluntary sharing provisions are retained. 
Keeping CISPA isolated in the National Security Act of 1947 will 
continue to make it difficult to see the overlap between CISPA and 
the SCA at first glance. To clarify the relationship between 
cybersecurity laws and privacy laws, CISPA would ideally include a 
provision to amend the SCA and thus more clearly address the 
165. Id. § 2(c)(1).
166. Id. § 2(c)(1)(D).
167. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-445 (2012). The April 17 report does not 
mention the SCA or the Electronic Communications Privacy Act by name, nor does 
it mention 18 U.S.C. § 2702. See id.
168. 158 CONG. REC. H2165 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2012) (statement of Rep. 
Nadler). Congressman Nadler likely meant to refer to the Stored Communications 
Act, which was enacted along with the Wiretap Act as part of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, because otherwise, referring to ECPA and the 
Wiretap Act separately would not make sense. See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to 
the Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1208 (2004). 
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relationship between voluntary “cyber threat information”
disclosures under CISPA and emergency disclosures under the SCA.
However, the new language that we propose in this Article is 
primarily limited to the text of CISPA. Amending the SCA should 
nonetheless be the subject of future study. 
The civil libertarians who oppose CISPA because of perceived 
threats to individual privacy are not necessarily mistaken about the 
existence of these threats. The mistake is in asserting that CISPA 
“‘waive[s] every single privacy law ever enacted in the name of 
cybersecurity.’”169 This assertion relies on an incomplete narrative 
about the degree to which modern information privacy law protects 
online privacy. Essentially, it assumes that existing Internet privacy 
law is much more protective of individual privacy than it really is. 
The efforts of civil libertarians would be better focused on 
reversing or limiting the underlying statutory precedent found in the 
emergency exception of the SCA. By pointing to a problem that is 
actually rooted elsewhere, and rejecting CISPA based on a 
misunderstanding of federal privacy law, opponents may succeed in 
preventing the enactment of a law with several valuable and novel 
elements. CISPA’s valuable contributions include the creation of 
procedures for granting security clearances to private-sector actors 
for cybersecurity purposes and also the provisions aimed at 
protecting civil liberties.170
E. Protections for Civil Liberties Within CISPA
The fact that CISPA permits voluntary sharing 
“[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law”171 rightly causes 
opponents to be concerned, but even without that provision, it is 
doubtful that current privacy law would make much difference in 
CISPA’s execution. Above, we noted that cyber threats can pose 
physical dangers and argued that these physical dangers could put 
169. McCullagh, supra note 18 (quoting 158 CONG. REC. H2148 (daily ed. 
Apr. 26, 2012) (statement of Rep. Polis)).
170. Other cybersecurity bills have also had some of these strengths, though 
we ultimately focused on CISPA because of the bill’s surprising resilience in three 
separate congressional sessions. The recently enacted NCPA also includes 
procedures for security clearances in § 7, but the language only singles out members 
of public-private partnerships and owners and operators of critical infrastructure for 
eligibility. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, § 7, 
128 Stat. 3066, 3070. The deficiencies of the security clearance language in the 
NCPA are addressed in Subsection IV.B.1. 
171. H.R. 234, § 3.
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CISPA in line with the existing emergency disclosure exception of 
the SCA. Even if these positions are not accepted, CISPA still 
imposes a number of requirements on government actors to protect 
consumers from abuse of the voluntary sharing provisions. These 
protections, by addressing the need to protect against abuse of 
CISPA, help to mitigate some of the potential harm to civil liberties
that the “notwithstanding” language might cause. These efforts to 
protect civil liberties help to bring CISPA closer to an 
implementation of our circle of trust framework.
CISPA includes three important types of provisions to protect 
privacy and civil liberties. First, CISPA imposes a number of 
restrictions on government use of cyber threat information in 
proposed § 1104(b) and 1104(c).172 Second, CISPA includes an 
annual reporting requirement to keep Congress informed of the use 
of voluntarily disclosed information, so that there will be 
congressional oversight of related privacy issues.173 Third, CISPA 
includes a sunset provision that will allow the law to expire five 
years after enactment.174 Because the reporting requirement is 
discussed above, and the sunset provision is largely self-explanatory, 
the remainder of this section will examine the restrictions on 
government use in more detail. 
Restrictions on government use of information are found in 
proposed § 1104(b)(2) and 1104(c). Proposed § 1104(b)(2) addresses 
the use and protection of information.175 For example, information 
disclosed to the federal government under CISPA would be 
exempted from disclosure under Freedom of Information Act 
requests and other statutes that require government entities to 
publicly disclose information. The federal government is also 
prohibited from using that information for “regulatory purposes.”176
This section also requires the government to anonymize or minimize 
private-sector information, as appropriate, before the government 
may share this information further. 
Proposed § 1104(c) contains additional restrictions on 
government use of cyber threat information. Affirmative government 
searches of shared information are limited by proposed §§ 1104(c)(1) 
and (2) to the purpose of investigating and prosecuting cybersecurity 
172. Id.
173. Id. § 2(c).
174. Id. § 4.
175. Id. § 3.
176. Id.
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crimes.177 Proposed § 1104(c)(3) prohibits the government from 
requiring private entities to share information, or from conditioning 
cyber threat sharing by the government on reciprocal sharing by the 
private sector. The government is also required under proposed 
§ 1104(c)(4) to refrain from using certain types of personal 
information. For example, the government cannot use information 
derived from library circulation records, book sale records, medical 
records, or records of firearms sales.178
If the government violates any of the restrictions on 
government use of cyber threat information, proposed § 1104(d) 
creates a private cause of action against the government, where the 
aggrieved parties can obtain damages, court costs, and reasonable 
attorney fees. This private cause of action ensures that government 
violations of the terms of CISPA can be redressed. 
This is not to say that the protections are perfect. A number of 
aspects of the protections should be amended to more effectively 
protect citizens. For example, the civil liability provision applies 
only to intentional or willful violations by the government, not 
negligent violations.179 In 2012, Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) also 
expressed concern during the floor debates that the two-year statute 
of limitations for bringing a suit is “unworkable, unfair, and 
unrealistic.”180
We also take issue with the terms “regulatory purposes” and 
“[a]ffirmative search,” neither of which are defined.181 During the 
floor debates in the 112th Congress, Rep. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-
MD) provides some context for “regulatory purposes,” stating that 
the government would be prohibited from using disclosed 
information as part of a criminal proceeding if the information 
provides “evidence of tax evasion.”182 However, this does not set 
firm limits on what would be considered a prohibited “regulatory 
purpose.” Future amendments to CISPA or future legislation that 
uses these terms should clarify what these terms mean. 
The reporting requirement of CISPA should also be revised to 
better resemble the reporting requirement of the Order. In the Order, 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id.
180. 158 CONG. REC. H2165 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2012) (statement of Rep. 
Nadler).
181. H.R. 234, § 3.
182. 158 CONG. REC. H2163 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2012) (statement of Rep. 
Ruppersberger).
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the report concerning privacy and civil liberties must recommend 
ways to “minimize or mitigate” risks to these interests.183 In contrast, 
reports about information sharing under CISPA must include 
“appropriate metrics to determine the impact of the sharing . . . on 
privacy and civil liberties.”184 There is a significant difference 
between requiring a report to address actual minimization and 
mitigation of threats and requiring a report to provide metrics to 
determine the extent to which sharing harms privacy and civil 
liberties. Accordingly, we recommend the amendment of CISPA to 
bring its reporting requirement more in line with the reporting 
requirement of the Order. 
As the above sections show, CISPA is a complicated piece of 
legislation that the public and legislators alike tend to either support 
or oppose vehemently. It is also a very important piece of legislation 
that addresses a serious threat. The threat that CISPA addresses is 
sometimes underestimated, even though cyber threats have the 
potential to do real world damage. The strength of privacy 
protections in the legislative context surrounding CISPA, on the 
other hand, is sometimes overestimated. CISPA’s ambivalent 
approach to privacy, while seemingly worrisome on its face, is 
ultimately consistent with how online privacy is currently treated in 
the law. Moreover, CISPA is largely consistent with our circle of 
trust framework, in that it addresses the movement of information 
from the public and private sectors into a space of shared 
information, and also addresses secondary usage of that information. 
For an alternative model for balancing security and privacy, we now 
turn to the question of presidential authority and the Order.
III. CYBERSECURITY, THE ORDER, AND PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
One major difference between CISPA and the Order is the 
direction of information flow. CISPA focuses on the movement of 
cyber threat information into the circle of trust from both the private 
and public sectors. As written, the Order would only permit the 
government to insert cyber threat information into the circle of trust. 
Government researchers might benefit from this arrangement insofar 
as it could result in agencies being more informed about what other 
agencies know, but the primary beneficiary would be the private 
183. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, § 5(b), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,740 (Feb. 12, 2013).
184. H.R. 234, § 2(c)(1)(D).
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sector, and the government actors would still not have access to 
cyber threat information held by the private sector. 
The Order also ensures that information about recommended 
security practices is readily available through the Cybersecurity 
Framework. By providing a voluntary cybersecurity standard, the 
Cybersecurity Framework thus facilitates the sharing of information 
about security measures between the government and the private 
sector.185 Additionally, adopters of the Cybersecurity Framework 
must have their implementation evaluated for compliance with the 
standard. The Cybersecurity Framework thus also represents a 
different kind of information being shared within the circle of trust. 
Through the Cybersecurity Framework, the government will share 
recommendations for cybersecurity practices, and the adopters will 
share information about their implementation of the Cybersecurity 
Framework so that both the government and the private sector can 
evaluate the success of the program. Now that Congress has enacted 
the Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, the National Institute 
for Standards and Technology (NIST) has formal congressional 
authorization to establish voluntary cybersecurity standards. Some 
questions, however, still remain about the scope of the President’s 
power and his authority to direct action on cybersecurity. 
Under the Constitution of the United States, the judicial, 
legislative, and executive branches of the government are each 
empowered to address controversies in different ways. Article III 
courts address live controversies through ex post adjudication.186
Congress enacts bills using the bicameral legislative process, but is 
explicitly prohibited from enacting ex post facto legislation.187 The 
judiciary is thus inherently backward-looking, while the legislature is 
inherently forward-looking. Under Article II, the executive branch is 
imbued with the authority to execute existing laws, with the 
President having some additional limited authority as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s military.188
Because of the inherently ex post nature of judicial resolution, 
the role of Article III courts in protecting the nation’s cyber 
infrastructure is minimal. It is fairly clear that Congress has authority 
to regulate interstate cybersecurity matters. Congress has also 
185. Exec. Order No. 13,636, § 7, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739-40.
186. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Unified Approach to Justiciability, 22 
CONN. L. REV. 677, 677-78 (1990) (providing an introduction to modern 
justiciability doctrines).
187. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
188. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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already addressed the idea of the federal government assisting 
private owners of critical infrastructure via the Homeland Security 
Act189 and the recent enactment of the NCPA.190 Notwithstanding the 
enactment of several cybersecurity bills in the waning hours of the 
113th Congress, congressional action on cybersecurity has been 
slow, which has led some to ask about the extent to which the 
President might have authority to act on these issues. Because the 
Order emphasizes the creation of cybersecurity standards, a major 
focus of this Part is on presidential authority to require the adoption 
of technology. Although the Cybersecurity Framework is proposed 
as a voluntary cybersecurity standard, and the CEA focuses 
extensively on the voluntary nature of the standard, it is worthwhile 
to also consider the possible legality of a mandatory cybersecurity 
standard.
A. Presidential Authority
Article II of the United States Constitution vests the executive 
power in the President, who is also designated the Commander-in-
Chief of the nation’s armed forces.191 Constitutional law scholars 
often discuss the idea of presidential power under Article II, the 
authorities granted by various clauses, and the possibility that the 
President might possess certain inherent presidential powers.192 Aside 
from the clause in Article II making the President the Commander-
in-Chief of the armed forces, another potential source of presidential 
power under the Constitution is the first sentence of Article II, which 
states that there is an “executive Power” that is “vested in a
President.”193 Proponents of the Vesting Clause theory have argued 
that the Vesting Clause creates a category of actions that are within 
189. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 223, 116 Stat. 
2135, 2156 (codified as amended in 6 U.S.C. § 143 (2012)).
190. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 
128 Stat. 3066. 
191. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
192. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, What Lurks Beneath: NSA Surveillance and 
Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 375, 376 (2008). Lawson, for example, is a 
proponent of the Vesting Clause as a source of presidential authority. Id. (“‘[T]he 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.’” 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1)). 
193. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; see also Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. 
Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 
HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1165-66 (1992) (setting forth an argument for interpreting the 
Vesting Clause as an independent grant of presidential authority). 
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the president’s authority, but the scope of this “executive Power” is 
not clear.194
There are also instances where Congress explicitly sets out 
authorities of the President over certain sectors during times of crisis, 
such as in § 606 of the Communications Act. Section 606(a) 
provides for presidential authority to prioritize communications that 
are viewed as essential to national defense and security.195 Section 
606(d) provides for presidential authority to suspend rules applicable 
to wire communications, to close facilities, or to place the 
government in control of communications facilities and equipment 
(provided just compensation is provided to the facility owners) when 
there is a state or threat of war.196 Sections 1701 and 1702 of Title 50 
of the U.S. Code also address presidential authority to take control of 
activities involving transactions with foreign countries when a 
national emergency has been declared to address an “unusual and 
extraordinary threat” that in substantial part arises from outside the 
United States.197 Commentators have discussed giving the President 
the authority to shut down networks in cases of emergency, but some 
have noted that this would be risky and would not necessarily 
address a demonstrable need.198
How might the executive branch step in and direct the behavior 
of private parties? On one hand, the executive branch possesses 
substantial regulatory power in the form of administrative agency 
regulations. The authorities of administrative agencies are delegated 
to them by Congress, and the required procedures are set forth in the 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).199 On the other end of the 
spectrum exists the authority that the President possesses as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s military forces, which some 
commentators say was included in the Constitution to set forth the 
hierarchy and ensure that there remains some degree of civilian 
control over military activity.200 The President’s power as the 
Commander-in-Chief includes the concept of martial law, which may 
194. See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 193, at 1175-78.
195. 47 U.S.C. § 606(a) (2012).
196. Id. § 606(d).
197. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1702(a) (2012).
198. Gregory T. Nojeim, Cybersecurity and Freedom on the Internet, 4 J.
NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 119, 133-34 (2010).
199. See 5 U.S.C. § 500 (2012). Subchapters 1 through 3 of Chapter 5 of 
Title 5 contain procedural requirements for the type of formal agency action that is 
likely to be relevant to the current topic. 
200. Lawson, supra note 192, at 381.
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be declared when there has been a breakdown of civil law and the 
government has to step in to control the situation.201
Each of these options likely requires explicit authorizing action 
by Congress. Executive agencies derive their authority from statutes 
and cannot act contrary to statute, though courts generally defer to 
agency interpretation on matters where Congress was unclear or 
ambiguous.202 There are also substantial questions about whether the 
President has the authority to unilaterally declare martial law or 
whether Congress must approve any such declarations.203 Under 
certain circumstances, however, the President can utilize his 
authority as the Commander-in-Chief of the nation’s military forces 
to order limited military action without congressional approval under 
the War Powers Resolution of 1973.204 Short of formal administrative 
action, martial law, or military action, though, does the President 
have binding authority to order private parties to take specific 
action? 
Recent commentary suggests that cyberspace will play a 
significant role in future wars,205 and Congress stated in the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2012 that the military should apply the 
laws of war to cyber conflicts.206 Many recent conflicts between 
nations have involved cyber warfare elements, including the conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine.207 Because of the danger that America’s
cyber infrastructure will be a target in future international conflicts
and the inconsistent speed with which Congress has been making 
progress on cybersecurity legislation, it is essential to determine 
whether the President has the power to require, or even politely 
request, that private providers of critical infrastructure improve their 
cybersecurity practices or share cyber threat information.
201. See 53A AM. JUR. 2D Military and Civil Defense § 374 (2014).
202. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
842-43 (1984).
203. See, e.g., Jason Collins Weida, Note, A Republic of Emergencies: 
Martial Law in American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1399-1400 (2004).
204. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548 (2012).
205. See Pragati Verma, Future Wars Will Be Fought in Cyberspace, FIN.
EXPRESS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.financialexpress.com/news/future-wars-will-
be-fought-in-cyberspace/505992.
206. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 
112-81, § 954, 125 Stat. 1298, 1551 (2011).
207. Sanger, supra note 12, at A18. The conflicts in Georgia and Syria also 
included cyberwar elements. Id.
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In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,208 the Supreme 
Court evaluated whether President Truman could seize steel mills to 
prevent interruption of manufacturing by a strike during a time of 
conflict absent a formal declaration of war. While a majority of 
Justices agreed that such a seizure went beyond the scope of the 
executive power under the Constitution,209 the Justices viewed the 
case in many different ways, resulting in five solo concurrences. The 
seizure was viewed as being analogous to legislating, so it would fall 
within Congress’s enumerated powers, not the President’s.210 Justice 
Black, a strict textualist, did not read the Constitution as allowing for 
any inherent presidential powers.211 Justice Frankfurter, on the other 
hand, suggested that the President may have limited inherent 
powers,212 while Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion provided a 
more helpful test for evaluating whether a President has authority to 
act.213 Under Justice Jackson’s test, there are three zones of authority 
for the exercise of a President’s powers. The President has the most 
authority when Congress approves the President’s action, the least 
authority when his acts go against the express or implied will of 
Congress, and an intermediate amount of authority, which means that 
he can act as long as Congress remains indifferent about the subject, 
when Congress has said nothing for or against the President’s
actions.
B. Executive Action on Cybersecurity and Critical Infrastructure
Protecting critical infrastructure has been an increasingly 
important priority over the last decade. The Homeland Security 
Administration is statutorily entrusted with many federal 
cybersecurity issues214 and may also assist private operators of 
critical infrastructure upon request by the private entities,215 but so 
far, government involvement in private cybersecurity matters has 
been purely voluntary on the part of the private entities. 
208. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
209. Id. at 587.
210. Id. at 587-88.
211. Id. at 585.
212. Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
213. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
214. See 6 U.S.C. § 131 (2012) (defining terms relevant to the Critical 
Infrastructure Information Act of 2002). 
215. Id. § 143.
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The Executive Order of February 2013 is just one of many 
actions by a sitting U.S. President acknowledging the importance of 
this topic.216 The three most recent presidential administrations, 
including President Obama during his first term, have all publicly 
promoted the importance of securing critical infrastructure.217 Several 
of these have been in the form of presidential directives. Presidential 
directives, sometimes called national security directives or 
presidential policy directives, are a specific category of executive 
orders relating to national security or defense.218 The position of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) is that such directives have the same 
legal effect as an executive order.219
In July 1996, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13,010, 
which established the President’s Commission on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP).220 President Clinton issued 
Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63) in May 1998 in an 
attempt to effect the changes recommended in the PCCIP’s report.221
The actions of the Bush administration on the topic include 
Executive Order 13,231,222 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
7 (HSPD-7),223 the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,224 the 
216. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
217. Critical Infrastructure Protection, Presidential Decision Directive 63, 
(May 22, 1998), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm; 
Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive 7 (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter PD-7], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214597989952.shtm#1; THE WHITE HOUSE,
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW (2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/
documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf; see also Eric A. Greenwald, 
History Repeats Itself: The 60-Day Cyberspace Policy Review in Context, 4 J. NAT’L
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 41, 41 (2010).
218. See Jeffrey C. Fox, What Is an Executive Order?, THISNATION,
http://www.thisnation.com/question/040.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
219. Legal Effectiveness of a Presidential Directive, as Compared to an 
Executive Order, 24 Op. O.L.C. 29, 29 (2000), available at http://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2000/01/31/op-olc-v024-p0029_0.pdf.
220. Greenwald, supra note 217, at 44.
221. See id. at 45-46. 
222. Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age, Exec. Order 
No. 13,231, 66 Fed. Reg. 53,063 (Oct. 16, 2001).
223. PD-7, supra note 217.
224. THE WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 
(2003), available at http://www.us-cert.gov/reading_room/cyberspace_strategy.pdf.
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National Infrastructure Protection Plan,225 and several directives that 
are still classified, such as National Security Presidential Directive 
16 (NSPD-16)226 and National Security Presidential Directive 54 
(NSPD-54).227 In 2009, President Obama issued the Cyberspace 
Policy Review.228 The Cyberspace Policy Review recognizes the 
importance of establishing leadership within the federal government 
to improve cybersecurity issues and describes cybersecurity as a 
global issue that also requires international cooperation.229 In 2010, 
President Obama declassified some aspects of NSPD-54,230 and a 
number of details about the previously classified Comprehensive 
National Cybersecurity Initiative are now available on the White 
House website.231 On February 12, 2013, President Obama issued 
Executive Order 13,636, titled Improving Critical Infrastructure 
Cybersecurity.232 Two years later, President Obama issued another 
executive order about cybersecurity, and this one focused 
specifically on information sharing.233
PDD-63, HSPD-7, and the Cyberspace Policy Review all stress 
the importance of the government working closely with the private 
sector to ensure adequate protection and implementation. Executive 
Order 13,636 and Executive Order 13,691 both emphasize
cooperation between the government and private sector. As is 
225. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION 
PLAN: PARTNERING TO ENHANCE PROTECTION AND RESILIENCY (2009), available at
http:// www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.
226. CLAY WILSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31787, INFORMATION 
WARFARE AND CYBERWAR: CAPABILITIES AND RELATED POLICY ISSUES 10 (2004), 
available at http://www.researchgate.net/publication/235012618_Information_
Warfare_and_Cyberwar_Capabilities_and_Related_Policy_Issues.
227. See Ellen Nakashima, Bush Order Expands Network Monitoring; 
Intelligence Agencies to Track Intrusions, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2008, at A03 
(discussing a classified directive authorizing federal intelligence agencies to monitor 
federal agencies’ computer networks).
228. THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 217.
229. Id. at 7-9, 20-21. 
230. Jaikumar Vijayan, Obama Administration Partially Lifts Secrecy on 
Classified Cybersecurity Project, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 2, 2010, 6:40 PM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2520273/cybercrime-hacking/obama-
administration-partially-lifts-secrecy-on-classified-cybersecurity-project.html.
231. The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative, WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cybersecurity/comprehensive-national-cybersecurity-
initiative (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). 
232. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
233.     Promoting Private Sector Cybersecurity Information Sharing, Exec. 
Order No. 13,691, 80 Fed. Reg. 9,349 (Feb. 13, 2015).
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evidenced by these documents, the President regularly makes 
recommendations that, if implemented, would alter many aspects of 
private businesses, but these recommendations are typically 
voluntary. 
C. The Potential for Mandatory Cybersecurity Regulations
To what extent does the President have the authority, either 
inherent or otherwise, to require the private entities in control of 
critical infrastructure to take steps to protect their systems? Under 
§ 606(d) of the Communications Act,234 the President may have the 
authority to take control of communications providers and require 
additional security if there is a “threat of war,” but there does not 
appear to be explicit correlating authority over other critical 
infrastructure, such as power and water companies.235
The wording of § 606(d), however, is potentially broad enough 
to permit the President substantial control over critical infrastructure 
access to the Internet because it authorizes government control over 
wire communications facilities and equipment when there exists a 
state or threat of war.236 The full ramifications of this wording are not 
fully clear, but there may be an argument that in enacting § 606(d), 
Congress intended for the President to have control over critical 
communications infrastructure in times of crisis, and that this intent 
would also extend to an intent that the President have control over 
the elements of that communications infrastructure that are 
inseverable from other types of critical infrastructure. Insofar as 
modern power companies need to be connected to the Internet to 
render services, § 606(d) might permit the President to exert some 
level of control over the methods through which these power 
companies are connected by wired communications technology to 
the outside world.237 Further analysis of the legislative history of 
§ 606(d) may be beneficial. Such a reading of § 606(d) would stretch 
234. 47 U.S.C. § 606(d) (2012).
235. See id.
236. Id. 
237. Zhang notes that many of the SCADA systems used by power 
companies are connected to the Internet or to a wireless network, and 85% of the 
relays in the electric grid system are digital. Zhang, supra note 43, at 327-28. In the 
case of power companies, it is unclear how this possible presidential authority will 
interact with the existing cybersecurity standards set by the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC). See id. at 324; see also Trope & Humes, supra note 
102, at 670 (expressing skepticism that it would be feasible for boards to comply 
with the Cybersecurity Framework and the NERC standards).
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the text of the statute and would likely only be appropriate as a 
remedy in extreme situations.
Because the reach of § 606(d) is unclear, the extent of 
presidential authority must also be analyzed in other ways. In 
evaluating whether the President has the authority to require private 
actors to implement stronger cybersecurity measures, we can turn to 
Justice Jackson’s test in his concurring opinion in Youngstown.238 Is 
this an area where Congress has expressly supported the use of 
presidential authority for this purpose? This is unclear, given the 
prior analysis of statutory authority, though there may be an 
argument that in authorizing presidential control of wired 
communications, Congress intended to give the President authority 
over the methods used to secure wired communications, since the 
language does allow government control to be exerted over 
equipment when there is a threat of war. 
The more important question in determining the scope of any 
such power is whether exercise of presidential authority would be 
counter to the express or implied will of Congress. This is a very 
tricky question and requires analogizing. Looking at the context of 
various statutes, we can begin to shape an idea of the conditions 
when Congress might or might not approve of the use of presidential 
authority to unilaterally impose requirements on private operators of 
critical infrastructure. Under § 143 of Title 6, involvement of the 
Department of Homeland Security in cybersecurity issues of 
privately held critical infrastructure is limited to the voluntary 
election of the private entities.239 This focus on voluntary election by 
private owners of critical infrastructure suggests that Congress would
not approve of the executive branch interfering with the private 
entities and controlling critical infrastructure as a matter of everyday 
affairs. However, § 606(d) of the Communications Act suggests that 
Congress would approve of the exercise of presidential authority 
when the country was under a state of war or a threat of war, and 
§§ 1701 and 1702 of Title 50 state that Congress would approve of 
the exercise of presidential authority over transactions with foreign 
nations when the exercise relates to a presently declared national 
emergency. 
238. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring).
239. 6 U.S.C. § 143 (2012) (authorizing DHS to provide cybersecurity 
assistance to private operators of critical infrastructure “upon request”). The 
voluntary nature of this intervention is reiterated by the National Cybersecurity 
Protection Act of 2014. Pub. L. No. 113-282, § 3, 128 Stat. 3066, 3066.
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Looking at other statutes, then, suggests that while there is not 
explicit support for the exercise of presidential authority in this 
precise context, it would not necessarily be counter to congressional 
will in all cases either, though presidential authority to impose 
cybersecurity requirements on private entities may be limited to 
when there exists a state of war, a threat of war, or a declared 
national emergency. In our view, declaring a national cybersecurity 
emergency and using § 606 to order critical infrastructure providers 
to implement stronger protections would be less deleterious of civil 
liberties than the “Internet kill switch” proposal which has been 
struck down in Congress repeatedly.240
Further analysis would be beneficial to evaluate whether 
Congress intended to give the President authority over measures 
taken to secure wired communications equipment in other critical 
infrastructure areas. Even if that intent is unclear, it is still apparent 
that it would not be in opposition to congressional will for the 
President to exercise authority in cases of conflict or declared 
national emergency. As long as Congress continued to remain 
neutral on the topic, then, the President could exercise some
authority in the interest of protecting national security. 
However, in post-9/11 America, we should be cautious about 
relying on emergency justifications. Liberal democracies rely on the 
rule of law for stability, and it can be difficult to ensure the rule of 
law when emergencies occur.241 There is a fundamental debate 
between theorists about how and when to address potential 
emergency situations. This debate involves issues such as whether 
exceptions should be carved out in the law ex ante or whether the 
government should act outside the law in the event of an 
emergency.242 This is a particularly relevant debate in the 
cybersecurity context, where there is currently very little regulatory 
guidance and the possible ramifications of a successful attack are 
quite severe. If an attack like a “cyber Pearl Harbor” occurs, as some 
240. David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH.
U. L. REV. 795, 798-99, 811 (2012).
241. Victor V. Ramraj, No Doctrine More Pernicious? Emergencies and the 
Limits of Legality, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY 3, 4 (Victor V. 
Ramraj ed., 2008). 
242. For example, in the Ramraj text, the contributors who wrote chapters 
took a variety of positions on this point. The debate between Dyzenhaus and Gross 
is particularly illustrative, with Dyzenhaus emphasizing ex ante handling of 
potential emergency situations and Gross suggesting that it may be a better idea for 
government agents to engage in extra-legal actions with the possibility of ratification 
of their illegal actions after the fact. Id. at 12. 
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commentators warn is possible,243 rapid legislative or executive 
responses are likely.244 If this happens without any sort of existing 
guidelines, the resulting government action could make CISPA look 
as innocuous as a lunch menu. Thus, while existing laws suggest that 
the President has the authority to take control of critical 
infrastructure in the event of a cybersecurity emergency, we strongly 
urge policy makers to push forward with CISPA or a similar 
legislative proposal, while continuing to seek a sustainable balance 
between security and privacy. Our circle of trust framework could be 
applied to this end.
D. Voluntary Cooperation
Requests for voluntary cooperation with the government are 
likely to be less intrusive upon civil liberties than mandatory 
regulations. Both CISPA and the Order emphasize this type of 
approach, and the NCPA and CEA bestow congressional approval on 
voluntary cybersecurity programs. The legislative proposal 
announced by the White House in January 2015 also focuses on 
voluntary information sharing.245
However, nominally voluntary executive action may still raise 
civil liberties concerns in practice. To demonstrate this, consider the 
wiretapping controversy that began under President George W. 
Bush. In evaluating the actions of the NSA, the Department of 
Justice concluded that the wiretapping was consistent with the 
authority of the President under the Constitution.246 The DOJ 
reasoned that the President has the authority to conduct activities that 
are critical to national security.247 In the wiretapping situation, where 
the Administration justified its activities by referring to the 
243. See, e.g., Arie J. Schaap, Cyber Warfare Operations: Development and 
Use Under International Law, 64 A.F. L. REV. 121, 172-73 (2009) (expressing the 
need to set out policies in advance of a “cyber Pearl Harbor-like attack”).
244. See Oren Gross, Extra-Legality and the Ethic of Political 
Responsibility, in EMERGENCIES AND THE LIMITS OF LEGALITY, supra note 241, at 88 
(discussing the rush after an emergency to pass new legislation). 
245. Securing Cyberspace, supra note 83.
246. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES 
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 1 (2006), 
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB178/surv39.pdf 
(“The President has the chief responsibility under the Constitution to protect 
America from attack, and the Constitution gives the President the authority 
necessary to fulfill that solemn responsibility.”).
247. Id. at 5.
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President’s inherent authority under the Constitution, private entities 
were generally not subject to legal compulsion.248
Telecommunications companies that cooperated with the NSA’s
wiretapping efforts often did so voluntarily, at least nominally so.249
The wiretapping controversy illustrates that making the private-to-
government information flow voluntary, as CISPA would do, does 
not guarantee the protection of civil liberties. The risks of voluntary 
programs are addressed in more detail in Section IV.A.
Information sharing is just one form that a voluntary program 
might take. A voluntary program could also focus on adoption of 
cybersecurity technology. This leads to a new question about what 
incentives might encourage voluntary participation in a technology 
adoption program, a question that is also addressed in the Order.250 In 
Section IV.A, we address this issue and provide some 
recommendations about incentives for companies to adopt the 
cybersecurity standards suggested by the Cybersecurity Framework.
While emphasizing security standards instead of information 
sharing might lessen some of the civil-liberties issues, the issue of 
providing private companies with security standards may still raise 
concerns. As long as only passive defense standards are requested,251
concerns about the company’s legal liability likely would not 
outweigh the value of participating in the program. However, if the 
President requested that critical infrastructure providers implement 
active defense mechanisms, including software to enable 
counterstrikes against cyber attackers to mitigate harm to the 
systems, that might require more careful oversight because of the 
potential liability issues if a counterstrike harms an innocent party. 
This situation could also raise potential international law issues due 
to the possibility that a counterstrike would hit targets located in 
foreign countries.252
248. This is not to say the government did not pressure providers to comply 
with its requests. Qwest, a major telecommunications provider that refused the 
NSA’s requests, was reportedly pressured by suggestions that Qwest might lose out 
on future classified contracts or that its failure to cooperate could endanger national 
security. See Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls,
USA TODAY (May 11, 2006, 10:38 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/
washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm.
249. See id.
250. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, § 8(d), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,742 (Feb. 12, 2013).
251. See Sklerov, supra note 104, at 21. For more of our discussion of 
passive defense, see Kesan & Hayes, supra note 98, at 471. 
252. See Kesan and Hayes, supra note 98, at 508.
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In the terms of our circle of trust framework for information 
sharing, the President is authorized to permit government secrets 
about cybersecurity to move into the center circle, but is probably 
not authorized to encourage private actors to move their own 
cybersecurity secrets into the center circle. Accordingly, 
accompanying legislation would be necessary in order to fully 
implement the circle of trust framework for cyber threat information 
sharing. The legislative proposal that the White House announced in 
January 2015 would provide some of the authorization needed,253 and 
therefore provides a promising path to operationalizing the circle of 
trust. The Cybersecurity Framework matches up with our circle of 
trust framework in a way different from the cyber threat information-
sharing provisions of the Order. Government-to-private information 
sharing is present when the government shares information about 
optimal cybersecurity protection, and permitting the government to
evaluate adoption of the Cybersecurity Framework is a form of 
private-to-government information sharing. Through the evaluation 
of the implementation, all parties can examine the success or failure 
of the program, and thus reap benefits. This form of information 
sharing by the private sector should not require congressional 
intervention, because it is merely evaluating the usefulness of 
information provided by the government and does not require the 
private sector to share its own secrets with the government.
E. Comparing Executive Order 13,636 with CISPA
In this Section, we will evaluate the Executive Order by 
comparing it with CISPA and other legislative proposals when 
appropriate. Executive Order 13,636, which is titled Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, has many themes in common 
with CISPA. Many of the differences are not that different. Consider, 
for example, the language used to describe the sectors to be 
protected. CISPA generally eschewed the term “critical 
infrastructure” in favor of the narrower term “utilities.”254 On the 
other hand, the Order adopted the term “critical infrastructure” as 
defined by the Homeland Security Act,255 but Presidential Policy 
Directive 21 (PPD-21) narrowed this term by specifically 
253. Securing Cyberspace, supra note 83.
254. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
255. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739.
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enumerating the sectors that would be covered.256 Thus, even though 
the Order uses the broader term “critical infrastructure,” it then 
narrows it by specifically enumerating covered sectors. The CEA 
and NCPA similarly use the term “critical infrastructure,” and the 
CEA also includes the limiting “sector-specific agency” language of 
PPD-21.257
Both CISPA and the Order focus on information sharing, and 
both address the need to make security clearances available to certain 
personnel employed by critical infrastructure providers.258 The 
biggest difference between the two is the direction of the flow of 
cyber threat information. CISPA allows threat information to flow 
from the private sector to the government, as well as from the 
government to the private sector.259 The Order only provides for 
threat information sharing by the government with the private 
sector.260 In other words, CISPA permits cybersecurity information to 
flow from both the public and private sectors into the central circle 
of trust. CISPA’s information flow model is also found in the 
legislative proposal announced by the White House in January 
2015.261
Both CISPA and the Order emphasize the voluntary nature of 
private-sector participation. However, while CISPA is focused only 
on the information-sharing aspect, §§ 7 and 8 of the Order focus on 
the possibility of setting cybersecurity standards through the 
Cybersecurity Framework and creating a voluntary program to 
encourage its adoption.262 The NIST makes available information 
about the progress of the Cybersecurity Framework on its website, 
including links to the Order, public comments, and webcast 
recordings of workshop meetings.263
256. Press Release, The White House, Presidential Policy Directive—
Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-21
(Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter PPD-21], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-
and-resil.
257. Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066 (2014); Pub. L. No. 113-274, 128 
Stat. 2971 (2014).
258. H.R. 234; Exec. Order No. 13,636, § 4, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740.
259. H.R. 234.
260. Exec. Order No. 13,636, § 4, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,739-40.
261. Securing Cyberspace, supra note 83.
262. Id. §§ 7-8, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740-42.
263. Cybersecurity Framework, NIST, http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/ 
(last visited Jan. 5, 2015). 
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The Order calls for DHS to propose possible incentives to 
promote participation in the voluntary cybersecurity program, though 
it notes the possibility that additional legislation might be required in 
order to implement some types of incentives.264 It is not clear what 
type of incentives President Obama is envisioning in this Order. In 
terms of financial incentive, tax breaks when a company is found to 
be sufficiently adhering to the program or tax credits for the cost of 
implementing suggested controls may both be viable options.
Another option is for the Cybersecurity Framework to exempt 
private entities from civil liability when the entity makes a good faith 
effort to comply with the Cybersecurity Framework.265 Liability 
exemptions are the only incentive for participation in CISPA as of 
March 2015. For purposes of the Order and the Cybersecurity 
Framework, adopting any of these three incentive models would 
most likely require congressional legislation, and none of the new 
cybersecurity laws enacted by Congress in December of 2014 
address incentives to adopt standards.
1. Liability Exemptions and Voluntariness
The Order does not contain any provisions addressing civil 
liability. CISPA contains two: proposed § 1104(b)(3), and proposed 
§ 1104(f)(5). Under proposed § 1104(b)(3), entities are exempt from 
civil and criminal liability for actions relating to identifying, 
obtaining, or sharing cyber threat information pertaining to their 
systems.266 This exemption itself does not cause CISPA to differ 
from the Order further than it already does because this exemption 
applies only to the private-to-government flow of information, which 
the Order does not permit. On the other hand, proposed § 1104(f)(5) 
is much broader and emphasizes that there will be no liability for 
entities that choose to not participate in activities that CISPA 
authorizes.267 Clarification is needed concerning whether this 
exemption from liability refers to civil liability. The way that it is 
currently written, it could prevent civil liability from attaching based 
264. Exec. Order No. 13,636, § 8(d), 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742.
265. See Trope & Humes, supra note 102, at 722 (noting that a congressional 
enactment would be required in order to give companies some assurance of 
immunity, in case some of the measures adopted for mitigating harm and creating 
more resilient systems did not work or caused additional harm). 
266. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
267. Id.
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on the company not following the voluntary program. Thus, 
cooperation with the program would be more easily considered 
voluntary because a private entity would not risk potential civil 
liability if they did not participate. The Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 
2015, which is based on President Obama’s January 2015 legislative 
proposal takes a similar approach to CISPA, focusing on voluntary 
information sharing enhanced by a broad liability exemption.268 The 
Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 is more specific than CISPA, 
explicitly exempting companies from civil and criminal liability for 
disclosure or receipt of lawfully obtained cyber threat indicators.269
Statutory liability exemptions are not uncommon. There is one 
such exemption in the Stored Communications Act excusing 
electronic communication service providers from liability for sharing 
customer information.270 The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 also
provides release from liability for electronic communication service 
providers who provided information to comply with a directive 
issued by the Director of National Intelligence and the Attorney 
General.271 However, as we discuss in Subsection IV.B.2, the
inclusion of a liability exemption for private entities that share 
information may also remove incentives for these entities to treat 
their customers’ information with care. 
In the case of a private entity that does not adopt a voluntary 
cybersecurity standard, an exemption from liability may reinforce the 
voluntary aspect of such a program. However, if the voluntary 
procedures are costly to implement, a free rider problem may 
develop, as those who do not make the investment in compliance 
nonetheless are still able to reap the benefits because the more 
protected firms will help to reduce the circulation of malware. 
Essentially, if a large enough percentage of firms adopt the standard, 
it could foster the cybersecurity version of herd immunity,272 and the 
unprotected firms could still reap benefits. From a social welfare 
268. S. 456, 114th Cong. (2015).
269. Id. at § 2.
270. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(e) (2012).
271. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(3) (2012).
272. “Herd immunity” is a term often heard in the context of vaccines. 
Community Immunity (“Herd Immunity”), VACCINES.GOV,
http://www.vaccines.gov/basics/protection/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2015). The idea is 
that by having most people in a community vaccinated for a particular illness, those 
who are not able to be vaccinated still reap benefits because the illness is not likely 
to appear in their community. Id. In the cybersecurity context, herd immunity could 
theoretically exist if a majority of networked systems were secure, because there 
would be fewer potential “carriers” of malicious code.
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perspective, it may also be desirable to allow consumers to point to 
noncompliance with federal standards as evidence of negligent 
cybersecurity practices. This would likely not be possible if DHS 
includes a liability exemption as an incentive for compliance with 
the Cybersecurity Framework.
2. Civil Liberties
As the Obama Administration’s response to CISPA indicates, 
the perceived civil-liberties failings of CISPA are a major reason that 
the administration is opposed to this legislation. The Order thus 
represents President Obama’s efforts to establish that security and 
civil liberties are not mutually exclusive, and to find that elusive 
balance between security and privacy. Section 1 of the Order 
underscores the Administration’s policy to enhance the security and 
resilience of critical infrastructure systems without sacrificing 
“business confidentiality, privacy, [or] civil liberties.”273 Section 5 
goes into more detail about protections for privacy and civil liberties, 
stressing that such protections will be based on the Fair Information 
Practice Principles (FIPPs), as well as other applicable policies, 
principles, and frameworks.274 The eight FIPPs are (1) Transparency; 
(2) Individual participation; (3) Purpose specification; (4) Data 
minimization; (5) Use limitation; (6) Data quality and integrity; (7) 
Security; and (8) Accountability and auditing.275
However, the January 2015 legislative proposal may 
compromise the administration’s civil liberties high ground in 
comparison with CISPA. In authorizing members of the private 
sector to share cyber threat indicators with the National 
Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center of DHS, the 
legislative proposal and the bill modeled after it echo the most 
problematic phrase from CISPA: “Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law.”276 As our analysis above shows, this does not truly 
circumvent any meaningful privacy law protection, but leaving this 
273. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, § 1, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
274. Id. § 5, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740.
275. Privacy Policy Guidance Memorandum No. 2008-01 from Hugo Teufel 
III, Chief Privacy Officer, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., on The Fair Information 
Practice Principles: Framework for Privacy Policy at the Dep’t of Homeland 
Security 1 (Dec. 29, 2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf.
276. S. 456 § 2, 114th Cong. (2015); Information Sharing Legislative 
Proposal, supra note 80, at §106(a). 
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wording intact could limit the effectiveness of future revisions to 
privacy law.277
There also may be privacy implications from the direction of 
information flow. The Order refers to reducing risks to privacy in the 
context of a legal regime that would only allow for cyber threat 
intelligence to flow from the government to the private sector. 
CISPA, on the other hand, only discusses privacy and civil-liberties 
concerns in the private-to-government direction of information flow.
Privacy concerns can be raised in the government-to-private context 
as well, as the government deals with a large amount of personally 
identifiable information. Why does CISPA not address privacy and 
civil-liberties concerns in the context of information flowing from 
the government to the private sector? 
Our circle of trust framework visualizes the central circle as 
receiving many protections, whether the information came from the 
government or the private sector originally. The fact that the Order 
creates a way for classified data to be shared with the private sector 
is significant because that provides a more comprehensive data set 
concerning what the government knows,278 even though cyber threat 
information from the private sector would not be placed in the circle 
under the Order. CISPA’s failure to account for possible privacy and 
civil-liberties concerns when the government discloses information 
may be inconsistent with our circle of trust framework.
In terms of privacy protections, the biggest advantage of the 
Order over CISPA is that, without the power to enact new 
legislation, the Order does not have the option of directing agencies 
to ignore existing privacy law. In stark contrast, through CISPA’s
current “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law” clause,279 all 
existing privacy law is disregarded–though as we noted above, it is 
unclear if the application of modern privacy law would change the 
way that CISPA could be applied. Some have criticized the Order as 
lacking “teeth” because of this,280 but that is primarily due to the very 
nature of an executive order. The administration’s January 2015 
277. See supra Section II.D.
278. See Zhang, supra note 43, at 339 (“Classified and unclassified data 
together create a comprehensive data set when either data group alone would present 
an incomplete picture.”). 
279. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
280. E.g., Dave Frymier, The Cyber Security Executive Order Is Not 
Enough, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:19 PM), http://www.wired.com/insights/2013/03/
the-cyber-security-executive-order-is-not-enough/.
1534 Michigan State Law Review 2014:1475
legislative proposal introduces these CISPA-style teeth,281 suggesting 
that notwithstanding the limited reach of the Executive Order, the 
White House’s goals for cybersecurity policy are ultimately 
consistent with many aspects of CISPA.
3. Presidential Policy Directive 21
The Order is accompanied by PPD-21, which primarily focuses 
on the responsibilities of the agencies rather than the overall policy 
goals. The focus on the role of government agencies in PPD-21 is 
much more detailed than the references to government agencies in 
CISPA. PPD-21 focuses on three strategic imperatives. The first 
strategic imperative emphasizes the need to unify efforts across the 
federal government relating to the protection of critical 
infrastructure.282 To further this goal, PPD-21 requires DHS to 
operate two critical infrastructure centers: one to focus on physical 
infrastructure, and one to focus on cyber infrastructure.283 The second 
strategic imperative focuses on baseline data and systems 
requirements to ensure format uniformity, interoperability, and 
redundancy to ensure continued access if there is a disruption.284 The 
third strategic imperative is to use data analysis to inform decisions 
regarding critical infrastructure, including ongoing analysis of 
incidents, threats, and emerging risks, to provide “a near real-time 
situational awareness capability.”285 This third imperative has the 
potential to create a very valuable resource for tracking cyber threats
so that information can be shared with the private sector in a timely 
manner.
PPD-21 also emphasizes the importance of sector-specific 
agencies (SSAs). Under the directive, SSAs are defined as the 
department or agency that is designated to work with a specific 
critical infrastructure sector on their security and resilience 
programs.286 PPD-21 identifies sixteen critical infrastructure sectors.
Of the sixteen, DHS is listed as the sole SSA for eight sectors and is 
a co-SSA for two additional sectors. This emphasis on the 
participation of DHS is consistent with existing trends in academic 
commentary about the role of DHS in handling cybersecurity issues 
281. Information Sharing Legislative Proposal, supra note 80, at §103(a)
282. PPD-21, supra note 256.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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relating to critical infrastructure.287 It also produces an additional 
similarity between the Order, PPD-21, and CISPA because each 
places significant focus on DHS and the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.288 This emphasis in the Order indicates that DHS will be a 
key player in the Cybersecurity Framework and is also likely to be a 
key player in future legislation focusing on cybersecurity.289 The 
National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014 is the first major 
example of such legislation.290 The NCPA references the situational 
awareness and sector-specific agency language of PPD-21,291 which 
suggests that in passing the NCPA, Congress intended to formalize a 
number of elements of PPD-21.
The Order and PPD-21 each require multiple annual reports. 
Section 5(b) of the Order requires an annual review of the report on 
privacy and civil-liberties risks associated with the program,292 and 
§§ 8 and 9 each require an annual report pertaining to critical 
infrastructure found to be at greatest risk.293 Under § 8(c), the SSAs 
are required to report annually to the President about the program 
participation by owners and operators of critical infrastructure at 
greatest risk, and under § 9(a), the list of critical infrastructure at 
greatest risk shall be reviewed and updated annually. PPD-21 also 
preserves the obligation of the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
submit annual reports “on the status of national critical 
infrastructure” and also requires SSAs to provide annual reports to 
support the Secretary in the preparation of his annual reports.294
These reporting requirements are similar to the reporting 
requirements of CISPA, though CISPA’s reporting requirements 
solely emphasize civil-liberties concerns relating to the sharing of 
cyber threat information by the private sector.
287. See Coldebella & White, supra note 116, at 240-41 (noting that DHS 
has established the Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Council and also has
Sector Coordinating Committees to address similar issues).
288. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, § 9(a), 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,742 (Feb. 12, 2013); PPD-21, supra note 
256; Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. (2015).
289. In recent years, critics of the DHS have asserted that the DHS has not 
properly addressed threats to the nation’s cyber infrastructure. See, e.g., Rebecca 
C.E. McFadyen, Protecting the Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure: Is the Department of 
Homeland Security Our Nation’s Savior or the Albatross Around Our Neck?, 5 I/S: 
J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 319, 323 (2009).
290. Pub. L. No. 113-282, 128 Stat. 3066.
291. Id. at § 3.
292. Exec. Order No. 13,636, § 5(b), 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,740.
293. Id. §§ 8(c), 9(a), 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,742.
294. PPD-21, supra note 256.
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However, we worry that both CISPA and the Order miss the 
mark on a very important topic: voluntariness. In our view, at least 
some private owners of critical infrastructure should be subject to 
mandatory government regulation on this topic, where their action or 
inaction could have dire national security consequences. Thus, when 
enacting formal legislation like CISPA, the 2015 legislative 
proposal, the NCPA, or the CEA, Congress should consider 
diverging from the pure voluntariness model and requiring disclosure 
of some classes of information. A purely voluntary technology 
adoption program may also be undesirable. Voluntariness is 
addressed in more detail in Section IV.A.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Ultimately, legislative changes are needed that reach an 
effective balance between privacy and security. In our circle of trust 
framework, information would be shared by both sides, and the 
legislative regime would ensure that disclosed information is used 
appropriately and civil liberties are protected. CISPA, the Order, and 
the NCPA all advance methods to allow the private-sector access to 
classified cyber threat intelligence. Information sharing by the 
private sector is addressed by CISPA and the Cyber Threat Sharing 
Act of 2015. In balancing cybersecurity and privacy, CISPA places 
greater value on security, while the Order places greater value on 
privacy, and the Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 2015 arguably comes 
close to placing equal emphasis on both. The Order stresses the need 
to balance privacy protections and the pursuit of more secure and 
resilient critical infrastructure systems, but the uncertain legal 
foundations for elements of the Cybersecurity Framework not 
addressed by the CEA will likely result in long delays. In this Part,
we provide recommendations to address issues surrounding both of 
these government actions in order to support the creation of a 
proposal that is consistent with our circle of trust framework.
A. The Big Hole in CISPA and the Order: Voluntariness
Should a circle of trust be built based on purely voluntary 
participation, or would a mandatory element be consistent with this 
framework? Thus far, cybersecurity proposals have predominantly 
emphasized voluntary participation. In CISPA, the voluntariness is in 
the context of cyber threat information sharing. In the Order, the 
voluntariness is in the context of adopting the Cybersecurity 
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Framework and the protections that it requires. The CEA 
underscores the voluntary nature of cybersecurity standards adopted 
by NIST.295 In our view, a purely voluntary approach to either cyber 
threat information sharing or technology adoption could hinder the 
effectiveness of the programs, interfere with the establishment of a 
circle of trust between the private and public sectors, and may even 
violate international law. 
Article 58 of the Geneva Convention Additional Protocol I 
requires a party to the conflict to protect its own civilians and 
civilian objects against “dangers resulting from military 
operations.”296 Jensen argues that complying with this legal 
obligation requires a proactive instead of reactive approach, and that 
a purely voluntary regime for cybersecurity preparedness might 
actually violate Article 58.297 However, a government-led 
cybersecurity preparedness program may involve the execution of 
some cyber operations on privately owned networks, which raises 
other issues. Butler warns that cyber operations could potentially 
affect private civilian networks in a way that violates the Third 
Amendment.298 If both Jensen and Butler are correct, this means that 
there may be tension between the Geneva Convention and the 
Constitution of the United States on the topic of voluntary 
cybersecurity programs. Butler’s legal analysis is novel and 
interesting, but ultimately, we disagree with his conclusions 
concerning the Third Amendment, and believe that it stretches the 
language of the Third Amendment too far.299
Beyond the question of whether voluntary cybersecurity 
programs would be legal or required, the relative strengths of 
mandatory and voluntary regulations have been widely debated, 
295. Pub. L. No. 113-274, § 101, 128 Stat. 2971, 2972 (2014).
296. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) 
art. 58(c), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 29.
297. Jensen, supra note 7, at 1561.
298. Alan Butler, When Cyberweapons End Up on Private Networks: Third 
Amendment Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1203, 1209-10 
(2013). The Third Amendment reads, in full, “No Soldier shall, in time of peace be 
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in 
a manner to be prescribed by law.” U.S. CONST. amend. III.
299. Specifically, we feel that Butler’s analysis stretches the meanings of 
“soldier,” “house,” and “quartered.” While it is true that policymakers are often 
called upon to apply old language to new technology, the environment created by 
cyberwarfare is sufficiently different from the environment of kinetic warfare that 
the creation of new policies would be more beneficial. 
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especially among law and economics theorists. The debate arises in 
many contexts, from environmental regulations,300 to the labeling of 
hazardous chemicals,301 to regulations affecting the financial 
sector.302 Much of the literature is especially focused on mandatory 
versus voluntary information disclosure. Some economic models 
conclude that if firms are required to publicly disclose certain types 
of information, this may give the firms an incentive to not actively 
seek out information about their own products, services, or 
operations.303 If the sort of model referenced by Polinsky and Shavell 
holds true, economists would expect firms to have more information 
about their own operations under a voluntary disclosure regime and 
less information under a mandatory disclosure regime.304 This model, 
however, relies on the assumption that the benefit of having that 
information is less than the cost that might be incurred by disclosing 
that information.
A regulation that requires information disclosure may be 
perceived as more market-friendly than a regulation that requires the 
adoption of specific practices.305 But some disagree about whether a 
mandatory information-sharing approach would have a greater effect 
on the market than a voluntary information-sharing approach. Some 
economic analysis suggests that firms would be likely to disclose 
300. See, e.g., JunJie Wu & Bruce A. Babcock, The Relative Efficiency of 
Voluntary vs Mandatory Environmental Regulations, 38 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT.
158, 159 (1999); Anne G. Short & Timothy P. Duane, Regulatory Spillover: How 
Regulatory Programs Influence Voluntary Efforts to Adopt Best Management 
Practices to Manage Non-Point Source Pollution, 35 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
J. 37, 40 (2011).
301. See, e.g., Goh Choo Ta et al., A Comparison of Mandatory and 
Voluntary Approaches to the Implementation of Globally Harmonized System of 
Classification and Labelling of Chemicals (GHS) in the Management of Hazardous 
Chemicals, 49 INDUS. HEALTH 765, 766 (2011).
302. See, e.g., Kalyani Munshani, Security Concern or Economic 
Motivations? The Regulation of Informal Value Transfer Systems, 12 OR. REV. INT’L 
L. 77, 78-79 (2010) (examining the response of financial institutions after the 
PATRIOT Act placed new mandatory reporting requirements on banks as well as on 
money services businesses like MoneyGram); Navin Beekarry, The International 
Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism Regulatory 
Strategy: A Critical Analysis of Compliance Determinants in International Law, 31 
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 137, 137 (2011).
303. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Mandatory Versus Voluntary 
Disclosure of Product Risks, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 360, 361 (2012).
304. Id. at 361-62.
305. Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency,
63 STAN. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (2011) (referring to disclosure mandates as “a 
comparatively market-friendly form of state intervention”).
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information voluntarily anyway, making mandatory disclosure 
requirements superfluous.306 In contrast, Fishman and Hagerty’s
model concludes that a mandatory disclosure regime would be more 
beneficial than a voluntary disclosure regime when the disclosed 
information is hard to understand.307 Once disclosed, intermediaries 
that assist with processing the disclosed information can make the 
difficult material easier to consume and understand.308
Some of the literature focuses on mandatory versus voluntary 
substantive regulations instead of information disclosure. Depending 
on the situation, mandatory regulations may be more efficient than 
voluntary regulations.309 Shapiro and Rabinowitz conclude that a 
voluntary compliance program for OSHA would be less successful 
than a voluntary compliance program administered by the EPA 
because of the differences between issues affecting the environment 
and issues affecting occupational safety.310
Because the efficiency of voluntary versus mandatory 
approaches may be context-dependent, some flexibility may be 
desirable. However, the flexibility should be handled very carefully 
so that the degree of regulation is optimal. If the regulations are easy 
to avoid, then firms will likely argue that they fall within an 
uncovered category. For this reason, broadly applicable regulations 
can be desirable. In the context of taxes, the Ramsey intuition 
emphasizes establishing a broad tax base that applies to everyone, 
rather than allowing too many exceptions to be carved out of the tax 
law.311 But as long as a regulatory program is always mandatory for 
some firms, there will likely be positive effects, including spillovers. 
The work of Short and Duane suggests that there may be some 
spillover effects between mandatory and voluntary environmental 
306. Michael J. Fishman & Kathleen M. Hagerty, Mandatory Versus 
Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed and Uninformed Customers, 19 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 45, 47 (2003).
307. Id. at 45.
308. Estlund, supra note 305, at 355.
309. Wu & Babcock, supra note 300, at 158; Ta, supra note 301, at 765-66; 
Sidney A. Shapiro & Randy Rabinowitz, Voluntary Regulatory Compliance in 
Theory and Practice: The Case of OSHA, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 97, 100 (2000)
(“Analysts suggest that voluntary regulatory compliance may be more efficient than 
traditional command and control regulatory approaches because it can produce the 
same (or more) protection at lower cost.”).
310. Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 309, at 100-01.
311. Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power 
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and 
Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REV. 985, 991 (1999). 
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programs, where firms that are not required to adopt certain “best 
practices” required of others may nonetheless adopt those practices 
for a variety of reasons.312 In the following subsections, we will 
explore how these principles would apply in the context of 
cybersecurity.
1. Voluntariness and Information Sharing
Currently, voluntary programs are emphasized by the proposed 
solutions to the problems facing cybersecurity professionals. The 
CEA and NCPA both strongly emphasize the voluntariness of private 
sector participation.313 As discussed in the case study above, the 
voluntary program of CISPA focuses on information disclosures 
instead of the adoption of best practices. Because CISPA permits but 
does not require private firms to disclose cybersecurity threat
information to the government, some might argue that a voluntary 
disclosure program would be more protective of privacy than a 
mandatory disclosure program. However, in Section III.D, we 
referenced the illegal wiretapping controversy as an example of 
when a voluntary information-sharing program is not protective of 
privacy and civil liberties. The wiretapping example illustrates that 
voluntariness is not a sufficient condition for the protection of 
privacy. 
Moreover, a voluntary program may have less structure 
imposed on disclosures, leading to a greater risk of overshare and 
thus a greater risk to privacy, as compared to a mandatory program 
that requests very specific types of information. There is a clear need 
for controls in the information-sharing context to prevent overshare, 
but CISPA currently lacks such controls. Under proposed 
§ 1104(c)(5), CISPA would require the government to notify the 
sharer if some of the shared information was not “cyber threat 
information.”314 The destruction of this extraneous information is not 
addressed, nor does CISPA suggest how such oversharing might be 
deterred. For example, should oversharing firms be required to 
disclose the overshare to their customers?
312. Short & Duane, supra note 300, at 99.
313. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282 
128 Stat. 3066; Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274 128 
Stat. 2971.
314. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
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Polinsky and Shavell note that some economic models would 
expect firms to have less information when disclosures are 
mandatory because the firms have an incentive to not investigate 
matters that might have to be disclosed.315 However, in the 
cybersecurity context, firms have a significant stake in the security of 
their systems and would therefore be likely to investigate possible 
vulnerabilities even if those vulnerabilities would then have to be 
disclosed. Accordingly, we do not believe that a mandatory 
disclosure regime for vulnerabilities would lead to firms having less
knowledge of vulnerabilities. 
The conclusions from Fishman and Hagerty’s model suggest 
that mandatory disclosure regimes would be appropriate when 
information is difficult to understand.316 Because of the complicated 
nature of cybersecurity matters, we believe that cybersecurity is a 
context where a mandatory disclosure regime would be more 
beneficial to the public than a voluntary disclosure regime. A 
mandatory disclosure regime could also expand the market for 
intermediaries who specialize in explaining the significance of 
vulnerabilities, exploits, and other cybersecurity issues.
Companies would rightfully be concerned about the possible 
harms to reputation from sharing information about specific 
vulnerabilities. The reality is that victims of cyber intrusions do not
like to admit that their systems have been compromised. Statistics 
compiled by the Computer Security Institute of San Francisco in 
2002 indicated that 90% of surveyed companies experienced 
computer security intrusions, but only 34% stated that they notified 
law enforcement about the intrusions.317 In 2004, the Computer 
Security Institute and the FBI published a report concluding that only 
20% of companies reported intrusions to law enforcement.318
Vulnerability to cyberattacks may be viewed as a weakness that
many companies do not want to reveal to their competitors.
For this reason, we suggest that most cybersecurity data 
intended for sharing within the circle of trust should be anonymized 
and aggregated, in addition to all of the information being carefully 
maintained by a trusted third party. This approach could be informed 
by the approaches taken with regard to employment compliance 
315. Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 303, at 361. 
316. Fishman & Hagerty, supra note 306, at 45.
317. Jason Krause, Hack Attack, 88 A.B.A. J. 51, 52 (2002). 
318. LAWRENCE A. GORDON ET AL., CSI/FBI COMPUTER CRIME AND 
SECURITY SURVEY 13 fig.20 (2004), available at http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/
db_area/pdfs/fbi/FBI2004.pdf.
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practices. As Estlund notes, much of the information that employers 
are required to disclose about employment compliance practices is 
made available in aggregate form, making the details less identifiable 
while still preserving the usefulness of the information.319 The public 
rarely, if ever, has access to firm-level data about employment 
compliance issues.320 This sort of model could be applied in the 
cybersecurity context by anonymizing disclosure information and 
emphasizing aggregated information, such as how many 
vulnerabilities were reported by each sector and how often the same 
vulnerabilities were identified by different firms. Anonymizing and 
aggregating this information could also help to allay privacy 
concerns. Further, analysis of aggregated and anonymized 
cybersecurity information across several sectors could be useful for 
tracing patterns of vulnerabilities and exploits.
Under a regime that emphasizes voluntary disclosure of 
vulnerabilities, companies that experience intrusions or discover 
vulnerabilities will conduct a cost–benefit analysis. The firm is likely 
to disclose information when the benefits of disclosure outweigh the 
costs, but is likely to stop disclosing and exit the program as soon as 
the costs outweigh the benefits. On the cost side, the firm will be 
concerned about the negative publicity and possible reputational 
harm from disclosure. On the other hand, if there is a failure to 
disclose that later is discovered, this could cause even more harm to 
the company’s reputation. On the benefits side of the equation, the 
company will consider possible benefits of disclosure, such as 
subsequent assistance by experts and the government resulting in a 
reduced chance of being attacked in the future. However, a survey 
revealed that one in four IT or security executives has a very low 
level of confidence in the government’s ability to prevent or deter 
cyberattacks.321 Thus, some companies may expect very few benefits 
to accrue from disclosing vulnerabilities, and the costs of disclosure 
will seem to outweigh the benefits. 
The degree of possible reputational harm and legal liability is 
even greater in the case of the most egregious attacks, which could 
create a perverse incentive for lower rates of disclosure when a 
vulnerability could result in the most harm. Additionally, because not 
everyone has to disclose in a voluntary disclosure regime, those that 
319. Estlund, supra note 305, at 396.
320. Id.
321. STEWART BAKER, SHAUN WATERMAN & GEORGE IVANOV, IN THE 
CROSSFIRE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 26 (2010), 
available at https://www.dsci.in/sites/default/files/NA_CIP_RPT_REG_2840.pdf.
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do disclose vulnerabilities will stand out, thus exacerbating possible 
reputational harm and turning the company into an attractive target 
for future attacks. 
A mandatory disclosure regime is likely to still result in some 
reputational harm, though the disclosures no longer stand out as 
much as they would in a voluntary regime. Because confidence in 
government may be low and providers may be unwilling to share 
information about security intrusions, a purely voluntary 
information-sharing program may be ineffective. Thus, a broad 
voluntary information-sharing program that includes personal 
information may be harmful to privacy and civil liberties, but even a 
narrow voluntary information-sharing program that is limited to 
vulnerability information may still be undesirable for entities that do 
not want to have that information released publicly. On the other 
hand, a compelled disclosure program is likely to still result in some 
reputational harm, and thus is likely to be opposed by the operators 
of critical infrastructure to whom it would apply. Giving control of 
this program to a trusted third party may mitigate some of these 
concerns, but it is not a panacea.
When discussing which type of regime would be optimal, we 
must first determine what the options are. The possibilities can be 
visualized as a matrix with voluntariness on one axis and 
identification on the other. 
Voluntariness
Identification
Voluntary 
Open
Compelled 
Open
Voluntary 
Anonymized
Compelled 
Anonymized
Policy makers who are calling for a model that emphasizes 
information sharing are currently focusing on voluntary open 
disclosure regimes. The clearest alternative to a voluntary disclosure 
regime is a compelled disclosure regime, but such a regime could 
still have negative effects on the reputations of private companies. A 
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third option is for anonymized compelled disclosures, as we suggest 
above. Under such a system, financial institutions could be identified 
by a prefix like FI and then assigned a number. Thus, required 
disclosures of cyber threat information would be associated with an 
anonymized identifier, potentially mitigating reputational harm to the 
provider, but while still ensuring that vulnerability information is 
made public. However, the reduction in reputational harm to 
companies from anonymized disclosures is offset by the harm to 
consumers who are denied information about specific companies and 
thus who are limited in their ability to seek redress if they are injured 
by the provider’s substandard procedures. A voluntary anonymized 
disclosure regime would have benefits and risks similar to that of the 
compelled anonymized disclosure regime.
The importance of considering the needs of consumers leads us 
to a fifth option for an information-sharing regime: voluntary open, 
with disclosures resulting in mitigation of liability. CISPA uses this 
sort of modified voluntary approach. Under this approach, 
companies would disclose vulnerability information without 
compulsion, and the disclosure would result in a reduction of 
possible liability. This sort of mitigation approach is reflected in 
proposed § 1104(b)(4) of CISPA, which provides covered entities 
with exemption from liability for actions taken concerning cyber 
threat information.322 However, we think that CISPA’s provisions go 
too far by only requiring actions in “good faith” and not including an 
exception for gross negligence. If a company is grossly negligent 
with regard to either its cybersecurity program or the handling of 
customer information, providing an exemption from liability purely 
because this negligence was disclosed would run counter to the best 
interest of the consumer. Thus, while CISPA’s model of “voluntary
open disclosure plus liability exemption” may address some of the 
concerns of the service providers, its breadth would ultimately not be 
favorable to consumers.
We suggest that Congress should adopt more detailed 
regulations to remove loopholes that might allow for abuse of 
information-sharing procedures. This regulation should also 
emphasize two of the alternatives that we suggested above: 
anonymized compelled disclosure and open voluntary disclosure 
with mitigation. The model of open voluntary disclosure with 
mitigation would be more appropriate for industries that handle a 
322. Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 114th Cong. 
§ 3 (2015).
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large volume of low-sensitivity information. Anonymized mandatory 
disclosure may be more appropriate for industries that are at higher 
risk or that would be the most disrupted by cyberattacks. Regardless 
of whether the firm’s identity is revealed or anonymized, all 
consumer information should be redacted or anonymized. If specific 
information about an individual is needed, as Chief Justice Roberts 
succinctly said in the recent case of Riley v. California, “get a 
warrant.”323
2. Voluntariness and the Adoption of Cybersecurity Standards
The Cybersecurity Framework is a voluntary program for the 
adoption of best practices, but324 a purely voluntary regime governing 
the adoption of cybersecurity protections is problematic because of 
the danger of inconsistent implementation. Shapiro and Rabinowitz 
warn that voluntary standards may be less protective or go after the 
lowest common denominator.325 While all providers do not need to 
be using identical protections, the protections should be reasonable 
substitutes for each other. If one provider uses the technological 
equivalent of fishnet while another uses the technological equivalent 
of iron bars, the broadest benefits might not be realized.
Because a purely voluntary regulatory program may be less 
efficient than a mandatory program in some situations, we urge 
policy makers to consider adding a mandatory element to the 
Cybersecurity Framework. As we discuss in Section IV.C, this could 
be done by requiring adoption by the entities found to be at highest 
risk. Currently, the CEA prohibits the NIST from requiring any 
specific solutions or technologies as part of its voluntary 
cybersecurity standards,326 and this prohibition preempts any 
mandatory element for the Cybersecurity Framework. We thus 
323. 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
324. But see Trope & Humes, supra note 102, at 725-27 (arguing that the 
Order is not truly voluntary because companies would be subject to pressure from 
the market to comply, and because a truly voluntary framework would not involve 
evaluations of those who adopt said framework). We disagree with this position. If 
the market wants companies to adopt the Framework, that does not mean that 
guidelines from the government are mandatory. Additionally, the process of 
evaluating the implementation of the Framework provides benefits to the company 
that adopts it, so we disagree with the assertion that there is no reason to evaluate 
compliance with a voluntary standard. 
325. Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 309, at 137.
326. Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-274, § 101, 
128 Stat. 2971, 2972.
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encourage the 114th Congress to reconsider this prohibition. The 
existence of a mandatory program could also contribute to spillover 
among the voluntary participants, who become better educated about 
risks through their association with adherents of the mandatory 
program, and who may also choose to adopt the best practices in case 
their firm is later found to be at highest risk. Thus, while we would 
not recommend making the entire Framework mandatory for all 
possible participants, we anticipate that there is a significant benefit 
to be gained from giving the Cybersecurity Framework some 
mandatory elements.
The danger of proceeding with cybersecurity standards on a 
purely voluntary basis is especially pronounced in critical 
infrastructure and SCADA systems. According to Symantec, there 
were fifteen publicly known SCADA vulnerabilities in 2010 and 129 
publicly known SCADA vulnerabilities in 2011.327 This is not 
counting undiscovered zero day vulnerabilities, like the four such 
vulnerabilities that were exploited by Stuxnet. This is not an area for 
a casual, “Do your best” type of approach. But instead of proposing 
that all critical infrastructure be legally obligated to adhere to the 
standard, we would limit the mandatory adoption requirement to 
critical infrastructure providers found to be at greatest risk of 
catastrophic damage, an analysis already required under the Order.
We feel that this approach strikes a good balance between safety and 
permitting private companies to continue to make system decisions 
based on their individual needs. The possibility that the firm may 
eventually have to comply may also contribute to the spillover effect 
and increase the participation level even among firms that are not 
currently required to comply.
If the standards remain purely voluntary, compliance with 
voluntary cybersecurity standards could be buttressed with 
provisions aimed at mitigation, like the modified voluntary-open 
information-sharing proposal presented above. In such a situation, 
voluntarily adopting the approved standard could reduce civil 
liability. An analysis applying game theory to interactions between a 
private firm and a regulator concluded that penalties should be 
mitigated for firms that engage in good faith self-policing.328 This 
model focused on penalties imposed by regulators, but the principle 
327. SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT: 2011 TRENDS 41 
(2012), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_
resources/b-istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en-us.pdf.
328. Jay P. Kesan, Encouraging Firms to Police Themselves: Strategic 
Prescriptions to Promote Corporate Self-Auditing, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 172.
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could also apply to civil liability, which is really just a private 
governance method of imposing noncompliance penalties. The effect 
on liability could alternatively be framed in terms of noncompliance, 
where noncompliance with a standard could be admitted as evidence 
of negligence.329 This approach is thematically similar to the doctrine 
of negligence per se in tort law. However, negligence per se
typically only applies to laws that are mandatory, so the analogy is 
not perfect.
Even with a component aimed at reducing liability, a voluntary 
security program would still permit companies to externalize the 
costs of their noncompliance, and these costs are then borne by their 
competitors or by society at large.330 A voluntary system also allows 
participants to exit the program if the benefits no longer exceed the 
costs. Thus, a voluntary program may result in higher costs and 
lower participation. We anticipate that a mandatory regulatory 
approach would eventually become accepted by firms as a cost of 
doing business, provided that the enforcement mechanisms are 
effective, the regulations apply equally to all firms in a specific 
sector, and the mandates are not excessively stringent.331
Collaboration between the government and the private sector to 
shape these mandates could help ensure that these elements are 
present. Thus, it may be desirable to eventually transition to a 
mandatory protection system that is designed by giving substantial 
consideration to the perspectives of the firms that would be 
implementing it. But for now, it would be a good starting point to 
limit mandatory protection requirements to critical infrastructure 
operators at highest risk, while providing liability mitigation for 
voluntary adoption of the standard by all other covered entities.
B. Changes to CISPA
To strengthen CISPA’s compatibility with our circle of trust 
framework, we now examine the possibility of amending some of 
CISPA’s language. Even though we encourage a shift away from a 
329. Shapiro & Rabinowitz, supra note 309, at 153 (noting that the danger of 
tort liability might provide incentives for voluntary compliance).
330. Id. at 104 (“A firm also is less likely to recoup its abatement costs if its 
competitors do not take similar safety or health precautions.”).
331. See Munshani, supra note 302, at 97-98, 105-08 (discussing banks’ 
support of financial regulations in the PATRIOT Act that they previously opposed 
when the regulations would only have applied to banks instead of other money 
services like Western Union and MoneyGram).
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purely voluntary approach to information sharing, the changes to 
CISPA that we propose are limited to the current and purely 
voluntary version of CISPA. Because CISPA was introduced in 
much the same form in both the 112th Congress and 113th 
Congress,332 and the version in the 114th Congress was introduced 
with no changes made from the version that passed the House in the 
113th Congress,333 this Section includes specific recommendations 
for CISPA’s language because of its resilience throughout the three 
most recent sessions of Congress. Recommendations contained in 
this Section can also serve as a guide for other cybersecurity bills.
1. Provisions of CISPA to Preserve with Few Changes
There are a number of beneficial provisions of CISPA that 
make valuable contributions to the legal framework and that would 
provide valuable support for the establishment of a circle of trust. 
One of these is proposed § 1104(a), which would create a way for 
members of the private sector to obtain security clearances so that 
government agencies can share classified cyber threat intelligence 
with qualifying members of the private sector.334 The limits on 
secondary disclosure of this information are addressed in proposed 
§ 1104(a)(5). By keeping the information within the circle of trust, 
secrets held by the government and any private information of 
citizens that might be found within that information stay secure. The 
security clearance provision of CISPA is superior to the security 
clearance provision of the NCPA because the NCPA language only 
singles out members of public-private partnerships and owners and 
operators of critical infrastructure for eligibility.335 Unlike the NCPA, 
CISPA’s security clearance provisions are broader, allowing security 
clearances to be issued to employees, independent contractors, or 
officers of a covered entity.336 By doing so, CISPA recognizes that 
making classified cybersecurity information available to those on the 
332. Compare Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 
112th Cong. (2012), with Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 
113th Cong. (2013).
333. Compare Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 
113th Cong. (2013), with Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 234, 
114th Cong. (2015).
334. H.R. 234 § 3.
335. National Cybersecurity Protection Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-282, 
§ 7, 128 Stat. 3066, 3070.
336. H.R. 234 § 3.
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ground is likely to be more valuable than granting clearances based 
on traditional bureaucratic structure.
Other important sections include proposed § 1104(d), which 
creates a civil cause of action against the government if voluntarily 
disclosed information is misused, and proposed § 1104(f)(5), which 
is a savings clause that explicitly prohibits the government from 
imposing liability on private entities that elect to not participate in 
the voluntary sharing program. Section 2 of the bill, which imposes 
reporting requirements on agencies concerning how the voluntarily 
shared information is used, is also vital because it keeps agencies 
accountable for use of information received from the private sector.
In the previous section, we urged that this should not be a 
purely voluntary regime. Our analysis of law and economics research 
has led us to conclude that mandatory disclosure regulations might 
actually be more protective of civil liberties than voluntary 
disclosure regulations in some contexts because the information 
collected would not depend on the whims of the information holders. 
However, we recognize the value of voluntary programs, especially 
in a context where public opinion is still uncertain. For this reason, 
we largely approve of CISPA’s provisions that support the “open 
voluntary with mitigation” model that we proposed above. 
2. Amending CISPA to Address Privacy Concerns
We analyzed all provisions of CISPA to identify the provisions 
that are the most and least consistent with our circle of trust 
framework, and in this Subsection, we will emphasize substantive 
provisions that should be deleted to make CISPA more compatible 
with our proposed legislative framework. First, we recommend 
striking the two instances of “Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law” within proposed § 1104(b)(1).337 Above, we argued that the 
“notwithstanding” language, while troubling, ultimately does not 
significantly undermine current privacy law because current privacy 
law is itself inadequate.338 However, if the underlying privacy laws
are improved, especially the SCA, the “notwithstanding” provision 
of CISPA would limit the effectiveness of any such improvements.
The “notwithstanding” language is also found in the Cyber Threat 
Sharing Act based on President Obama’s legislative proposal 
337. Id.
338. See supra Subsection II.D.2.b.
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announced by the White House in January 2015, and should likewise 
be removed from that bill.339
Second, while we support the exemption from liability under an 
“open voluntary with mitigation” model, the exemption from liability 
in proposed § 1104(b)(3) should be limited. This section currently 
eliminates any means of redress that otherwise might be available to 
aggrieved parties against the private entities disclosing the 
customers’ information, and the way it is written does not take the 
interests of consumers into account.340 If the information that moves 
from the private sector into the central circle of trust is collected on a 
voluntary basis, the current broad exemption from liability removes 
any disincentive for careless overshare. For private consumers to 
reap the most benefits from the voluntary nature of CISPA’s
information-sharing provisions, companies should be encouraged to 
weigh the interests of their customers when deciding both what and 
how much information to disclose to the government. If companies 
receive a blanket immunization from liability, they have no incentive 
to be discerning about the disclosures. Our most modest proposal for 
amending this subsection is to eliminate the phrase “or for sharing 
such information in accordance with this section”341 and adding a 
requirement that the entity act not only in good faith but with the use 
of the best available detection technology. The added requirement of 
best available detection technology overlaps with the Cybersecurity 
Framework and would help to mitigate the threat of false positives.
This could reduce instances of customer information being disclosed 
“in good faith” when it did not actually implicate any cyber threat 
information. The exemption should also not cover negligent 
behavior. Thus, our amended version of proposed § 1104(b)(3) 
would read as follows:
(3) EXEMPTION FROM LIABILITY—
No civil or criminal cause of action shall lie or be 
maintained in Federal or State court against a protected 
entity, self-protected entity, cybersecurity provider, or an 
officer, employee, or agent of a protected entity, self-
protected entity, or cybersecurity provider, acting in 
339. S. 456, 114th Cong. (2015); Information Sharing Legislative Proposal, 
supra note 80, at § 103(a).
340. H.R. 234, § 3.
341. Id.
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good faith, non-negligently, and with the use of the best 
available cybersecurity and detection technology—
(A) for using cybersecurity systems to identify or obtain 
cyber threat information; or
(B) for decisions made based on cyber threat information 
identified, obtained, or shared under this section.
Additionally, having struck the “notwithstanding any other 
provisions of law” provisions of proposed § 1104(b), this section 
should be amended to recognize that information shared under 
CISPA comes within the scope of the protections of the Stored 
Communications Act and other privacy laws. Thus, we recommend 
amending proposed § 1104(b)(4) to read as follows:
(4) Relationship to other laws requiring the disclosure of 
information. 
(A) The submission of information under this subsection 
to the Federal Government shall not satisfy or 
affect—
(i) any requirement under any other provision of 
law for a person or entity to provide 
information to the Federal Government; or
(ii) the applicability of other provisions of law, 
including section 552 of title 5, United States 
Code (commonly known as the ‘Freedom of 
Information Act’), with respect to information 
required to be provided to the Federal 
Government under such other provision of 
law.
(B) Information sharing under this subsection is subject 
to the protections and exceptions of other laws that 
regulate and protect privacy, including but not 
limited to the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, the Stored Communications Act 
of 1986 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712), the Wiretap Act 
(18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522), and the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (Pub. L. 
104-191).
As we noted in our analysis above, the Stored Communications 
Act would likely permit voluntary information sharing under the 
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emergency exception of § 2702, and the application of the Fourth 
Amendment is currently unclear.342 Thus, while bringing CISPA 
within the scope of sector-specific privacy statutes will contribute to 
the protection of certain categories of sensitive information, it should 
remain largely unaffected due to the lax approach that privacy laws 
of broader application take with respect to the Internet. Nevertheless,
adding this provision leaves room for the Supreme Court or 
Congress to increase the protections for information transmitted 
online without leaving a large CISPA-sized gap in the protections. If 
the SCA as currently enacted does not protect this information 
adequately, as we suggest with our analysis of the emergency 
exception of § 2702, amendments to the SCA will be necessary. As 
written, the voluntary sharing provisions of CISPA are consistent 
with statutory precedent, and the civil liberties and personal privacy 
issues that this raises should be addressed by amending that statutory 
precedent and thus closing the door for future abuses. If the 
information-sharing regime becomes mandatory, then § 2703 of the 
Stored Communications Act will likely apply, and cybersecurity 
legislation that looks to create a mandatory information-sharing 
regime would also have to amend § 2703.
In the interests of protecting privacy and making the circle of 
trust more trustworthy, Congress should also amend paragraph 5 of 
subsection 1104(c). This section requires the government to notify a 
disclosing entity if the disclosed information does not fit the 
definition of “cyber threat information.”343 Putting the private party 
on notice that it is disclosing information outside the scope of the 
statute is very important because these disclosures could potentially 
lead to additional liability concerns for the disclosing party. 
However, this provision does not address what the government may 
then do with the “non-cyber threat information” so received and does 
not propose any method for deterring overshare. Because this 
interferes with the effectiveness of the circle of trust, we urge that 
this potential loophole be closed by requiring the destruction of such 
information and requiring the oversharing entity to notify customers 
that it disclosed more information than necessary. Thus, proposed 
§ 1104(c)(5) should be amended to read as follows:
(5) NOTIFICATION AND DISPOSITION OF NON-
CYBER THREAT INFORMATION— If a department 
342. See supra Section II.D.
343. H.R. 234, § 3.
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or agency of the Federal Government receiving 
information pursuant to subsection (b)(1) determines 
that such information is not cyber threat information, 
such department or agency shall: 
(A) notify the entity or provider sharing such 
information pursuant to subsection (b)(1); 
(B) be prohibited from any use of this information; 
(C) promptly destroy any information that is voluntarily 
disclosed pursuant to subsection (b)(1) and fails to 
meet the definition of “cyber threat information” set 
forth in subsection (h)(4); and
(D) require the entity or provider to give notice to the 
customers whose information may have been 
included in the extraneous disclosure.
In most cases, we expect that disclosure of personally 
identifiable information or other information included in proposed 
§ 1104(c)(4) would also fall within § 1104(c)(5) as non-cyber threat 
information. Accordingly, not only could the federal government not
use this type of information under (c)(4), but it would also have to 
notify the disclosing firm and destroy the disclosed copies of the 
sensitive personal information. The Cyber Threat Sharing Act of 
2015 partially implements this recommendation by requiring the 
destruction of disclosed information that is not a cyber threat 
indicator, but it does not require the government to notify the 
discloser.344
We also recommend revising several of CISPA’s definitions in 
the interest of narrowing the scope and protecting the privacy of 
citizens. To better address personal privacy concerns and increase 
intersectoral trust, “cyber threat information” should be redefined in 
a more limited fashion to limit the information that can be shared 
with the government, such as by explicitly stating that information so 
disclosed may not include any personally identifiable information
and clarifying that malware and source code are the intended targets 
of this disclosure. We also recommend limiting the parts of the 
definition that refer to “efforts,” which could encompass merely 
talking about something on social media, to explicitly refer to actions 
leading towards actual incidents. The definition for “cyber threat 
344. S. 456, 114th Cong. (2015).
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intelligence”345 may be kept largely as it is, except with the addition
of explicit references to malware and source code.
The voluntary sharing provision of CISPA permits private 
entities to share information for a “cybersecurity purpose[].”346 The 
definition for this term is broad in much the same way as the 
definition for cyber threat information, and thus should be narrowed 
accordingly in the interest of protecting consumer privacy. This 
means including a prohibition on including personally identifiable 
information, limiting references to “efforts,” and inserting a 
provision addressing malicious source code and malware. 
C. Suggestions for the Cybersecurity Framework
Having examined possible changes to the language of CISPA, 
we turn now to our recommendations for the implementation of the 
Cybersecurity Framework. The Order permits the government to 
share cyber threat intelligence with qualified members of the private 
sector and also urges the creation of voluntary compliance standards 
for cybersecurity in the form of the Cybersecurity Framework. In this 
Section, we present recommendations for an approach to the 
Cybersecurity Framework and similar legislative efforts.
In setting out the policy of the Order, § 1 emphasizes the need 
to “collaboratively develop and implement risk-based standards.”347
This standard-setting approach is what we would classify as 
technology forcing, but it is also a technology-neutral approach to 
improving cybersecurity.348 The Cybersecurity Framework currently 
has the potential to create mandatory demand for cybersecurity 
products. The Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS) program of the 
federal government is an example of an existing program that creates 
mandatory demand for relatively new energy products, and as the 
empirical work of Kesan, Slating, and Yang suggests, this mandatory 
demand appears to have a positive effect on the industry.349 By 
generating mandatory demand, the RFS program appears to assist the 
345. See id.
346. Id.
347. Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Exec. Order No. 
13,636, § 1, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,739 (2013).
348. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 319, 333 (2005).
349. Jay P. Kesan, Timothy A. Slating & Hsiao-Shan Yang, Mandatory 
Demand as a Policy Instrument: The Case of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) 
Biofuel Program (Ill. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 11-24, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/pape.tar?abstract_id=2083698.
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development of the market, improving competition between the 
firms and contributing to the growth of economies of scale.350
In addition to alternative fuels, this sort of government 
intervention can also be observed in the information technology 
sector. Technology-forcing approaches in the information technology 
sector may often be more efficient than regulation that relies on 
purely market-based incentives.351 Technology-forcing regulations 
may also be especially appropriate in areas where the focus is on 
concerns about safety.352 However, technology-forcing regulations 
are sometimes uncertain because it is impossible to predict how a 
given area of technology will develop. Addressing this problem may 
require an ongoing dialogue between the public and private sectors 
concerning state-of-the-art technologies.353 Our proposed circle of 
trust framework would provide a constructive environment for that 
ongoing dialogue.
The Order emphasizes that the Cybersecurity Framework will 
set cybersecurity standards. There are three main options for 
standards that regulations can adopt: (1) Performance standards, 
which do not specify required technology but instead describe how 
the technology should operate; (2) Design standards, which explicitly 
state how a technology must operate; and (3) Best available 
technology (BAT) standards, which require the adoption of the best 
technology available and thus provide flexibility for future 
technological developments.354 Adoption of a BAT standard would 
generally require entities to upgrade their systems as better 
technologies become available. Performance standards allow the 
most deference to the market in terms of determining the final 
technology.355 Thus, a BAT standard is desirable when the greatest 
emphasis is placed on technology, and a performance standard is 
desirable when the end goal is to let the market determine the best 
implementation. The Clean Air Act is an example of a regulatory 
regime that largely adopts BAT standards, with the focus of the CAA 
being on gradually removing a harm.356
The flexibility of a BAT standard would be consistent with the 
Order’s stated focus of the Cybersecurity Framework as being risk-
350. Id.
351. Kesan & Shah, supra note 348, at 338. 
352. Id.
353. Id. at 334. 
354. Id. at 340-41. 
355. Id. at 340. 
356. See id. at 341. 
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based and technology neutral. A performance standard would also be 
consistent with the approach stated in the Order. A design standard 
would likely be inconsistent with this approach, as it would require 
more detail concerning technology implementations and would not 
be easily adaptable.357 Either a performance standard or a BAT 
standard would also control for one of the major possible downsides 
of technology-forcing regulation by providing a more open-ended 
approach to technology that does not require the government to 
employ precognitive abilities to determine how future cybersecurity 
technologies will develop. The current version of the Cybersecurity 
Framework indicates that the standard will be performance-based, 
and the language emphasizes “best practices.”358 While this may raise 
questions about whether the Cybersecurity Framework is ultimately 
more of a BAT standard or a performance-based standard, this at 
least ensures that it will have more flexibility than a design standard. 
Many more factors must be considered in addition to the basic 
approach that will be taken. There are two sides in any market: a 
supply side and a demand side. As some empirical work shows, 
mandating demand can aid in the development of a fledgling 
industry.359 Discussions of regulatory approaches often invoke the 
familiar idiom of “carrots and sticks,” where “carrots” are offered as 
positive consequences for compliance and “sticks” are offered as 
negative consequences for noncompliance.360 Mandating demand in 
the cybersecurity context could involve a “stick” approach, such as a 
requirement that all operators of networks over a certain size 
implement cybersecurity protections or face sanctions. A “carrot”
approach to mandating demand might instead provide tax breaks or 
tax credits for companies that adopt adequate cybersecurity 
technology. Greater demand means that the producers of 
cybersecurity technologies would sell more products. However, this 
alone may not encourage improvements in cybersecurity technology. 
357. It may be possible to have a technology-forcing design approach in the 
cybersecurity context that is technology neutral. For example, such an approach 
might set a deadline by which time a service provider would have to show that they 
can successfully repel 98% of attacks.
358. See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-
final.pdf.
359. Kesan, Slating & Yang, supra note 349.
360. Gerrit De Geest & Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, The Rise of Carrots and 
the Decline of Sticks, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 341, 354-55 (2013).
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Thus, we recommend also adopting regulations aiming at the supply 
side of the cybersecurity market. 
Regulating the supply side can also either be done through a 
carrot or stick approach. A stick approach to the cybersecurity issue 
could be similar to the way that the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration (NHTSA) approached automobile safety in the 
1960s. The NHTSA’s performance-based requirement that 
manufacturers produce a “‘passive occupant restraint system’” led to 
the development of air bags, which have since become a standard 
safety measure in all automobiles.361 A carrot approach could utilize 
a competition where the winner’s product is guaranteed to be 
purchased. This guaranteed purchaser option is an approach that has 
been examined in the context of vaccine development362 and may 
also be applicable for spurring R&D in cybersecurity. 
Either a carrot or stick approach could be effective at 
incentivizing the supply side. The NHTSA example shows that using 
a stick approach for the supply side may encourage the development 
of technologies for protecting consumers, so this method of approach 
might be effective for cybersecurity research. With such an 
approach, cybersecurity companies might be given a deadline for 
developing a passive cyber defense system that facilitates quick 
recovery from attacks. A carrot approach is likely to be attractive 
because it would require a lighter regulatory touch and thus involve 
less government interference with the market. A guaranteed 
purchaser approach to cybersecurity could include a contest where 
the prize is that the government will purchase a large number of 
copies of a winning cybersecurity solution that is able to detect, 
repel, and repair damage from the highest number of threat 
categories. In addition to incentivizing innovation, the large scale 
government purchase could then be repurposed to distribute the 
winning technologies to the sectors most in need of the strongest 
cybersecurity protection. Further research should be conducted to 
determine whether the supply side for cybersecurity products would 
be better encouraged by a carrot or stick approach to regulatory 
intervention. 
Our initial expectation on this point is that a carrot approach 
may be more effective at incentivizing innovation on the supply side. 
361. Kesan & Shah, supra note 348, at 337.
362. See MICHAEL KREMER & RACHEL GLENNERSTER, STRONG MEDICINE:
CREATING INCENTIVES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL RESEARCH ON NEGLECTED DISEASES 42
(2004). See generally Kyle Wamstad, Priority Review Vouchers—A Piece of the 
Incentive Puzzle, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 126 (2009).
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We thus propose that an effective model for the Framework would 
require the adoption of best practices, and simultaneously provide 
supply-side incentives in the form of contests and guaranteed 
government purchases. This best practices approach, combined with 
encouraging continual improvement in these technologies, will 
ensure that entities that adopt the Framework will be obligated to not 
allow their security systems to become outdated while ensuring that 
better technologies will be made available under a reliable timeline.
While recognizing that the Order has limited legal authority, 
we ultimately disagree with the Order’s emphasis on purely 
voluntary adoption of the Framework. Telling our nation’s critical 
infrastructure providers “Do the best you can” is not always going to 
be enough. In some situations, voluntary participation may be 
sufficient, and offering government support in exchange for 
participation may sometimes provide adequate incentive. But when a 
critical infrastructure provider is deemed to be at greatest risk for an 
intrusion that could cause catastrophic harm, this provider’s
participation in the Framework should be mandatory. The Order 
already requires the identification of critical infrastructure providers 
at greatest risk. In Section IV.A, we argued that it would be 
appropriate to take this identification a step further and require 
identified providers to adopt the Framework.
Ultimately, our recommendations for the Cybersecurity 
Framework would likely require concurrent congressional action to 
be effective. The NCPA and CEA represent initial steps in codifying 
congressional support for the Cybersecurity Framework and PPD-21, 
but the narrow language of both of these enacted statutes interferes 
with the creation of a circle of trust. Thus, policymakers should 
continue to evaluate cybersecurity standards and ways to promote 
public-private cooperation on this topic. The Order includes a 
number of good ideas, and in this Section, we have provided three 
suggestions for how to implement these good ideas in a meaningful 
way: (1) Adopt a flexible standard; (2) Offer supply-side and 
demand-side incentives; and (3) Make participation mandatory for 
providers at greatest risk. These recommendations emphasize 
security procedures that can be implemented with little to no 
deleterious effects on privacy and civil liberties, while also 
facilitating technological innovation. 
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CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity is a big deal. Protection of critical infrastructure 
is a matter of national security. The Obama Administration 
recognized this during President Obama’s second term by issuing 
executive orders about cybersecurity in 2013 and 2015. Congress 
recognizes this as well, as indicated by the introduction of dozens of 
cybersecurity bills over the last several years and the enactment of 
several cybersecurity laws in the waning hours of the 113th 
Congress. Unfortunately, protecting cybersecurity has proven to be a 
much more partisan issue in Congress than it should be. 
Additionally, advocates for private enterprises discourage the 
imposition of meaningful cybersecurity requirements on privately 
owned critical infrastructure, while advocates for civil liberties and 
privacy react with alarm to regulation attempts that involve the 
collection of information about cyber threats. The resistance from 
both service providers and citizens indicates an alarming lack of 
intersectoral trust on the issue of cybersecurity.
Privacy and security are not mutually exclusive, but balancing 
the two interests may require cooperation and the occasional 
compromise. This Article focuses on CISPA and the Order to 
illustrate this quest for balance. Because such a quest will require 
tools, we propose a new conceptual information-sharing framework.
We describe our framework as establishing a circle of trust, where 
information disclosed by the government and the private sector is 
ensured adequate protection and limitations on secondary use are 
well-established. A conceptual framework that balances privacy and 
security while permitting information sharing should emphasize 
intersectoral cooperation and the creation of this circle of trust. 
Examining CISPA and the Order has permitted us to analyze 
the value of their respective voluntary regimes. We argue that a 
purely voluntary regime is undesirable in both contexts. Government 
intervention with the free market should be minimized, but when 
cybersecurity issues have implications for national security, some 
degree of mandatory regulation would be beneficial. Voluntary 
programs can be effective in some situations, but potential 
participants may interpret voluntary programs to be aspirational 
guidelines. In the sensitive context of cybersecurity, aspirational 
guidelines for security standards could lead to low levels of 
compliance and an ineffective regulatory regime, and aspirational 
guidelines for cyber threat information sharing could lead to the 
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withholding of valuable information by those who do not participate 
and a greater risk of overshare by those who do participate.
One advantage to having at least some mandatory element is 
that it is likely to have positive spillover effects that improve the 
status of actors covered by the voluntary program. A mandatory 
element may also enhance the circle of trust, insofar as it assures the 
voluntary participants that they will have ready access to the data 
that they need. A mandatory program also provides them with 
guaranteed peers who will be able to contribute new knowledge to 
partially mandatory standard adoption.
The Cybersecurity Framework and accompanying executive 
actions now have legislative support in the form of the NCPA and 
CEA, but these statutes do not embody our proposed circle of trust 
framework. CISPA could be easily revised to accompany the 
Cybersecurity Framework, operationalize the circle of trust 
framework, and fill in some of the gaps left by the new statutes 
without threatening privacy and civil liberties. A careful, deliberative 
process aimed at protecting cybersecurity and civil liberties must be 
implemented and tested within a reasonable timeframe, before the 
emergence of a cybersecurity crisis that causes us to suspend reason.
